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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Recently major earthquakes in the western United States, such as 
at Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1964, and San Fernando, California 
during 1971, have brought public attention to this natural hazard. 
Earthquakes cannot be prevented, but measures can be taken to limit the 
amount of damage done. This has prompted earthquake hazard studies for 
seismically active areas. 
The urban complex of Reno-Sparks, Nevada, lies in one of the seis-
mically most active areas of the United States. This area is in the 
fault-shattered transition zone between the eastern Sierra Nevada and 
the Basin and Range Province. The study area occupies the structural 
basin bounded by the Virginia Range on the east, the Carson Range on 
the west, Steamboat Hills to the south, and the eastern part of the 
uplifted Peavine Mountain block to the north (Figure 1) . The area is 
surrounded by active fault zones: the Walker Lane on the east, the 
Steamboat Hills complex to the south, the Carson Range fault and 
Olinghouse fault zone on the west, and the Peavine Mountain fault to 
the north. 
Although in historic time (i.e., since 1800 A.D.), no major earth-
quakes have occurred in the study area, ten large historic earthquakes 






















(From Exxon map of California and Nevada, 1972) 
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Figure 2. Historic earthquakes in Nevada 




(From Leet et al, 1978) 
Earthquake magnitude Approximate energy released 

















2 pounds T.N.T. 
13 pounds T.N.T. 
63 pounds T.N. T. 
397 pounds T.N.T. 
1,990 pounds T.N.T. 
6 tons T.N. T. 
32 tons T.N.T. 
199 tons T.N.T. 
1,000 tons T.N.T. 
6,270 tons T.N.T. 
31,550 tons T.N. T. 
199,000 tons T.N.T. 
l,000,000 tons T.N.T. 
6,270,000 tons T.N.T. 
31,550,000 tons T.N.T. 
199,000,000 tons T.N.T. 
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et al. (1973) have predicted the maximum possible earthquake within 100 
kilometers of the Reno-Sparks area as having a magnitude of seven or 
greater on the Richter Scale (see Table I) with a return period of 80 
years. The expected maximum ground acceleration would be 0.64 gravities 
( g. ) having a predominant period of 0. 3 seconds and 30 seconds of 
strong ground motion. It is also likely that an event of magnitude 
equal to or greater than 5.5 Richter could occur with a return period 
of 30.4 years and would have a maximum ground acceleration of 0.18 g. 
with a predominant period of 0.2 seconds and 6 seconds of strong ground 
motion. 
Fortunately, no extensive damage to life and/or property has 
recently been recorded in Nevada, but this is only because major 
earthquakes have occurred in remote areas. Within a major metropolitan 
center, such as Reno-Sparks, there are a number of emergency and 
essential facilities which serve the public, such as the police depart-
ment, fire departments, utility companies, hospitals, communication 
systems, transportation networks, National Guard and Civil Defense. In 
the event of an earthquake, it is imperative that these facitilites 
continue to function, since they are the lifelines for a disaster-
struck community. 
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the adequacy of these 
facilities to deal with a probable earthquake which could occur in this 
metropolitan area. It is intended to be an aid to planners, government 
uni ts and the general public for evaluating works of man as they are 
distributed in this seismically active area. 
BACKGROUND 
To date, several reports have been done on indi victual problems 
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related to a potential earthquake in the Reno-Sparks area by geology 
and civil engineering classes at University of Nevada in Reno. They 
have been working on a catalog of building parapets and have also 
studied some schools, utilities and emergency f aci li ties. The Nevada 
Bureau of Mines in 1976 published an Environmental Folio, including a 
series of maps showing slope, soils, hydrology, land use, geology, 
physical properties and other geologic hazards. The Reno-Sparks Civil 
Defense is preparing a disaster plan for earthquake hazards, the Army 
Corps of Engineers has conducted a reservoir survey in the Truckee 
Meadows area and a study is underway to evaluate the possible seismic 
response of bridges and over-passes in the Reno-Sparks area by Dr. 
Bruce Douglas, Engineering Department, University of Nevada. 
METHOD OF STUDY 
This report will integrate all the previous specialized reports 
and new data. Information in this report is based on research conducted 
from 1973 through 1980. Personal interviews with numerous authorities 
in the area formed an important part of this study. Historical seismic 
activity in the study area and similar areas is used to predict the 
impact of a possible earthquake upon the cities of Reno and Sparks. All 
data will be summarized and presented as maps with overlays at a scale 
of 1:24,000. The end result will be quantified hazard maps pinpointing 
specific problem areas in the event of an earthquake. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
Since the San Fernando earthquake of 1971, an increasing aware-
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ness of earthquake hazards has grown, but most Reno-Sparks residents 
give little credence to the possibility of a major earthquake in their 
area. This is due to the fact that Reno-Sparks has never experienced a 
large earthquake in historic times. This is also the main reason why 
these cities lag behind California cities in prevention of earthquake 
damage. It will be shown that Reno could sustain major damage in the 
event of a large earthquake. Many of the emergency and life-sustaining 
facilities are on geologically dangerous structures. Most agencies also 
lack specific post-earthquake plans of action. Sparks, however, being a 
younger town, can probably cope with an earthquake within the city. 
Both towns, however, have no specific codes on building design or 
location other than the Uniform Building Code. This writer recommends a 
complete rewriting of the present building codes along the lines of 
those routinely used in seismically active areas of California. 
CHAPTER II 
EARTHQUAKES AND SEISMICITY 
THE CAUSE OF EARTHQUAKES 
Earthquakes are caused by movement of crustal materials as the 
rocks of the earth adjust to tectonic forces. The basic idea of plate 
tectonics is that the earth's outermost part, the lithosphere, consists 
of several large rigid plates. Each plate is about 80 km deep, moves 
horizontally relative to neighboring plates and "floats" on a plastic 
zone of denser rock material. At the edge of a plate, where contact 
with other plates occurs, deforming or tectonic processes operate on 
the rocks, causing physical and chemical changes. The frequency of 
earthquakes is highest in a zone where two plates are being pushed 
against each other or where one plate overrides another. Earthquakes 
also take place within plates, but at a lower frequency. 
The major plates are the Indian, Pacific, Antarctic, American, 
African, and Eurasian. The boundaries of these plates are the loci of 
present-day earthquakes and volcanic activity. Ocean ridges, in gen-
eral, have shallow earthquakes. In areas marked by oceanic trenches and 
arcs, both shallow and deep earthquakes are found. 
Plate motion with respect to other adjacent plates results in 
three main types of boundaries. Divergent boundaries result where 
plates move away from one another; if they move toward each other, a 
convergent boundary exists; and when a plate moves past another plate 
in a parallel fashion, transform boundaries occur (Leet et al, 1978). 
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Divergent boundaries exhibit tension interaction which results in 
shallow-focus earthquakes. Convergent plate boundaries are character-
ized by compression which results in trenches and island-arc volcanoes 
with shallow, intermediate and deep-focus earthquakes along ocean-ocean 
plate contacts. When continental plates meet, young mountain ranges 
result from the piling up of continental masses and shallow-focus 
earthquakes are common (e.g., Himalayas). 
Intracontinental transform boundaries are characterized by fault 
zones and shallow focus earthquakes over a broad zone. Fracture zones 
with shallow focus earthquakes in narrow belts mark ocean-ocean trans-
form boundaries. 
The most active zone of seismicity is the Circum-Pacific belt. It 
accounts for over 80% of the total seismic energy released throughout 
the world. Most of the remaining energy released (15%) occurs in the 
Alpine or Mediterranean and trans-Asiatic zones (Leet et al, 1978). 
Earthquakes in these zones have foci aligned along mountain chains. 
Other parts of the world generally seem to experience only occasional 
earthquakes. There are also huge continental areas lacking earthquakes 
(aseismic regions) such as the Canadian shi'eld, Brazilian shield, 
Fenoscandian shield, northern Asia, the African Massif, western Aus-
tralia, peninsular India and Greenland. 
In 1961, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey began establishing a 
worldwide network of seismograph staions. Knowledge of earthquakes has 
rapidly expanded, owing to the quantity and quality of records ob-
tained. Currently, 6,000 earthquakes per year are located. Computeriza-
tion has helped data processing in determining earthquake location, 
depth of foci, and size (Leet et al, 1978). 
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EARTHQUAKE FOCUS 
In the study of earthquakes, the term focus designates the source 
of a given set of earthquake waves. Tbese earthquake waves are, in 
general, generated from rupture of the earth at some depth. Most source 
dimensions are around 50 km in length and breadth and, on a world-wide 
average, the frequency of occurrence decreases rapidly with depth. 
Earthquakes are classified as to depth of focus: shallow or S 
quakes emanate from above 70 km, intermediate or ! quakes from 70-300 
km, and those below 300 km are termed deep (Bolt, 1976). Shallow-focus 
earthquakes are the most devastating and make up three-fourths the 
total energy released in earthquakes throughout the world (Leet, 1978). 
Moderate to large shallow earthquakes are usually followed by numerous 
smaller quakes, called aftershocks, in the same area. A major earth-
quake is often preceded by smal 1 quakes or f oreshocks from the source 
area, and aftershocks are nearly universal after a major quake. 
The epicenter of an earthquake is the area on the surface 
directly above the focus point. This area usually experiences the 
greatest surface shaking. 
TYPES OF SEISMIC WAVES IN EARTHQUAKES 
There are three basic types of elastic waves that make up the 
shaking that is felt and causes damage in an earthquake. These waves 
are similar in many important ways to waves in water. Of the three 
types, only two propagate within a body of rock. The faster of these 
body waves is called primary or P wave. Its motion is the same as that 
of a sound wave in that, as it spreads out, it alternately compresses 
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and dilates the rock. The slower wave through a body of rock is called 
a secondary or §. wave. As an S wave propagates, it shears the rock 
sideways at right angles to its direction of travel. The actual speed 
of P and S waves depends on the density and elastic properties of the 
rock and soil through which they pass. In most earthquakes, P waves are 
felt first; the effect is similar to sonic boom. Seconds later, the S 
waves arrives, which shakes the ground with an up-and-down and side-to-
side motion. It is the S waves which effect most of the damage to 
structures. The third type of earthquake wave is called a surface wave, 
because its motion is near the ground surface. Surface waves correspond 
to ripples of water that travel across a lake. Surface wave motion is 
located at the surface itself, and as the depth below the surface 
increases, the wave displacements become less. Surface waves can affect 
foundations of structures and can affect bodies of water. 
Body waves (the P and S waves), as they move through rock layers, 
are reflected. or refracted at interfaces of rock types. Whenever either 
is reflected or refracted, energy is converted from one type to waves 
of the other type. So, after the first few shakes on land occur, a 
combination of body waves is usually felt in strong ground motion. When 
body waves reach the ground surface, most of their energy is reflected 
back into the crust, which results in simultaneous up-and-down-moving 
waves on the surface. This creates amplification of shaking at the 
ground level, which increases shaking damage. 
Heavy shaking near the center of a large earthquake consists of a 
mixture of wave types that cannot be distinctly separated. 
Earthquake waves are affected both by soil conditions and by topo-
graphy. In alluvium and water-saturated soil, the amplitude of seismic 
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waves can be increased or decreased as they pass to the surface from 
more rigid basement rock. Ridge tops and bottoms can have intensified 
shaking, depending on the direction from which the waves are coming and 
on wavelength. 
Seismic waves are recorded on seismographs which, in turn, enable 
us to measure the period (time between passing waves) of an earthquake. 
a seismograph consists of three basic parts: an inert member, a 
transducer and a recorder. The inert member is a weight suspended by a 
wire so that it acts like a pendulum but is made to move in only one 
direction and is damped so that it will not swing freely. A transducer 
picks up relative motion between the pendulum and the ground and 
converts it into a recordable form. To record motion in all directions, 
it is necessary to use three seismographs, one to record vertical 
motion, and two to record horizontal motion at right angles to each 
other. 
If the ground under the instrument oscillates with a short 
period, the mass will stay essentially still; it then serves as a 
reference point to measure the earth's motion. The inert members are 
made to stand still during the passage of waves of a selected period 
range. Usually, two sets are used, one for short period waves and one 
for long. The motion is finally recorded on a cylindrical drum around 
which a sheet of paper is wrapped. The drum rotates at a constant 
speed, and a pen sketches out displacements, producing a continuous 
record. 
Three types of waves are recorded on seismographs. The first to 
arrive at the station, P (Primary) waves, the second to arrive, S 
(Secondary) waves, and the last to arrive are the long (L) waves. Since 
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the difference in arrival times increases as the distance from the 
source increases, the difference between the arrival of P and S waves 
gives a measure of the distance to the focus. It generally takes at 
least three widely separated stations to accurately locate a focus with 
this method. 
INTENSITIES OF EARTHQUAKES 
Earthquakes are generally measured by intensity and magnitude. 
Magnitude attaches a number to an earthquake which is independent of 
the distance from the earthquake focus and independent of the geology 
and soil condition. Intensity is a rating of the severity of the ground 
motion at a specific location. It is assigned a value by observation 
and description of damage. Intensity is of especial importance to 
evaluation of earthquake hazards at the surface of the earth. 
The scale intensity of measurement is based upon personal sensa-
tions, the behavior of natural objects and physical damage to natural 
and man-made objects. In the U.S. , the most widely used and accepted 
scale is the 1931 modified version of the Merccalli Scale. It has 
twelve degrees of intensity and takes into account various construction 
types (Table II, Cluff et al, 1970). From careful observation of 
earthquake effects, investigators attempt to determine what places have 
been shaken by equal amounts of energy. These amounts are then plotted 
with the points of equal intensity connected to make an isoseismic map. 
Unfortunately, relying upon subjective impressions of an earthquake is 
an inaccurate way to compile information. Therefore, in 1935, the 
Richter scale was devised, based on instrumental records of seismo-
graphs (Table I). 
TABLE II 
MERCALLI SCALE 
(From Bolt, 1978) 
Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable circumstances. 
II Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. Delicately 
suspended objects may swing. 
III Felt quite noticeably indoors. especially on upper floors of buildings. but many people 
do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibration 
like passing of truck. Duration estimated. 
IV During the day felt indoors by many. outdoors by few. At night some awakened. 
Dishes. windows. doors disturbed: walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy 
truck striking building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably. 
V Felt by nearly everyone. many awakened. Some dishes. windows. etc .. broken: a 
few instances of cracked plaster: unstable objects overturned. Disturbances of trees. 
poles, and other tall objects sometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop. 
VI Felt by all. many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy furniture moved: a few 
instances of fallen plaster or damaged chimneys. Damage slight. • 
VII Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construc-
tion; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures: considerable in poorly built 
or badly designed structures: some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving 
motor cars. 
VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures: considerable in ordinary substantial 
buildings, with partial collapse: great in poorly built structures. Panel walls thrown 
out of frame structures. Fall of chimneys. factory stacks. columns. monuments. walls. 
Heavy furniture overturned. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts. Changes in 
well water. Persons driving motor cars disturbed. 
IX Damage considerable in specially designed structures: well-designed frame structures 
thrown out of plumb: great in substantial buildings. with partial collapse. Buildings 
shifted off foundations. Ground cracked conspicuously. Underground pipes broken. 
X Some well-built wooden structures destroyed: most masonry and frame structures 
destroyed with foundations: ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Landslides considerable 
from river banks and steep slopes. Shifted sand and mud. Water splashed (slopped) 
over banks. 
XI Few. if any. (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Broad fissures 
in ground. Underground pipelines completely out of service. Earth slumps and land 
slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly. 
XII Damage total. Practically all works of construction are damaged greatly or destroyed. 
Waves seen on ground surface. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects are 




Magnitude is based on ground motion as recorded by seismographs 
at varying distances. The most used method in the U.S. for calculating 
magnitude is that of C. T. Richter. Richter's scale is based on the 
amount of motion in certain waves expressed as a number. In 1967, an 
international commission on magnitude redefined the scale. The measure-
ment on this scale is measured on a logrithmic basis, each higher whole 
number on the scale represents an earthquake ten times stronger than 
the next lower number. 
GROUND FAILURE 
Widespread damage can occur during ground shaking in an earth-
quake when surface deposits fail. This ground failure can take the form 
of landslides, liquifaction and settling. Steep slopes with unstable 
rock or soil are especially vulnerable to landslides during shaking, 
al though slide blocks can move on even gentle slopes when liquifiable 
or unstable clays underlie the area. Severe damage resulted from such 
sliding on low slopes in both the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 (Bolt et 
al, 1977) and the San Fernando earthquake of 1971 (R. Yeats, personal 
communication date 1978). 
Liquifaction, a change of soil into a dense liquid-like medium 
during shaking, is one of the most destructive types of ground failure. 
Liquif action can occur wherever loose water-saturated sediments or 
soils are subjected to cyclic shaking. When water-saturated sands are 
subjected to shaking, individual grains cease to be in stable contact 
and become partially suspended in water, so that interstitial pore 
water bears the weight of the overlying material. Such material has the 
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shear strength of a dense liquid and solid structures will float or 
sink in liquified sediment according to the density of the structure 
relative to the bulk density of sediment and water. Sewer lines and 
septic tanks tend to float, while buildings tend to sink in liquified 
sediments. The low shear strength of liquified material accounts for 
landslides on low slopes and for failure of some earthen darns, where 
liquifiable material is involved. An example of earthen darn failure is 
the partial collapse which occurred in the San Fernando Darn, during the 
1971 San Fernando earthquake, when hydraulic fill in the dam's interior 
liquified (Bolt et al, 1977). 
After severe shaking, surface sediment may settle differentially, 
creating changes in the local shape of the land surface. Such changes 
can destabilize structures. 
FAULTING 
Faul ts are normally associated with seismic activity, al though 
earthquakes may occur in association with volcanic activity, as wel 1. 
Displacement along surface faults and attendant shaking can cause 
severe damage by truncating pipelines and disclocating man-made struc-
tures. The activity of faulting lends a clue to seismic activity in an 
area. It is therefore important to consider types of fault movement and 
their occurence in the Reno-Sparks area. 
Faul ts are classified according to type of movement and level of 
activity (Table III). Convergent plate boundaries like the Alaskan 
Coast and the Himalayas have high-angle reverse faults or low-angle 
thrust faults. These faults are characterized by compressive movements 
and crustal shortening and thickening. Divergent plate boundaries 
TABLE III 
SYSTEM FOR CLASSIFICATION OF FAULT ACTIVITY 
ACTIVITY CLASSIFICATIOtl 
AHO DEFINITION 
ACTIVE • A 'AULT WHICH HAS 
EXPERIENCED OISPLACEl'lfNT 0, 
SU,FtCll!NT GlOLOGIC RECENCY 
TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS 
POTENTIAL 'OR 01 SPLACl!HENTS 
IN THI! NEAil l'UTURE • 
POTENTIALLY ACTIVE - A l'AULT 
WHICH HAS NOT RUPTURED IN 
HISTORIC TIME, IUT 'OR WHICH 
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES 
THAT RU,.TURE HAY HAVE OCCUR-
RED IN THE RECENT GEOLOGIC 
PAST ANO THI! RECURRENCE 
PERIOD COULD 81! SHORT ENOUGH 
TO BE 0' !NGlHURIMG SIGNll"l-
CANC!. 
ACTIVITY UNCERTAIN • A l'AULT 
fOR WHICH INSUl'FICtENT EVI-
DENCE IS AVAi LABLE TO OEl'IN( 
I TS REC::""IT Of GREE OF ACTI VtTY 
011. ITS RECUUl!NCE INTERVAL. 
NO l'AULT SHOULD SE CONSIDl!llED 
TENTATIVELY ACTIVE• UNTIL 
PROVEN OTHERWISE, If IT HAY 
BE SIGNll'lCANT TO THE PROJECT. 
INACTIVE - A FAULT ALONG 
WHICH IT CAN 8E DEMONSTRATED 
THAT SURFACE l'AULTING HAS NOT 
OCCURRED IN THE RECENT GEO-
LOGIC PAST, AHO THAT THE 
RECURRENCE INTERVAL JS LONG 
ENOUGH TO Bf OF NO ENGINEER• 
ING SIGNll'ICANCE. 
(From Cluff, 1972) 
HlSTORIAL 
(1) SURFACE ,AULT-
ING ANO ASSOCIATED 
STRONG !ARTHQUAKES, 
(2) TECTONIC FAULT 
CREEP, OR Gl!OOETl C 
INDICATIONS OF 
FAULT SI.IP. 
NO RELIABLE REPORT 




(1) GEOLOGICALLY YOUNG• DEPOSITS 
HAVE HEN DISPLACED Oil CUT BY 
l"AULTING, 
(2) l'RESH GEOMORPHIC FEATURES 
CHARACTER IS Tl C OF ACTIVE l'AUL T 
ZONES PRESENT ALONG ,AULT TRACE, 
(l) PHYS! CAL GROUND-WATER BARRI -
!RS PRODUCED IN GEOLOGICALLY 
YOUNG• OEPOS I TS. 
•TH! EXACT. AGE 0' THE OEPOS I TS 
WILL VAAY Wt TH EACH PROJECT ANO 
. DE,.l!NOS UPON THI! ACCEPTABLE 
LEVEL 01' RISK ANO THE TIME IN-
TERVAL WHICH IS CONSIDERED 
SIGNIFICANT FOR THAT PROJECT. 
(1) G!OM0$1PHI C l'E.ATURES CHARAC• 
TEltl S Tl C 01' ACTl VE FAULT ZONES 
SUBOUEO, !llOOEO, ANO DISCONTINU-
OUS. 
(2) P"AULTS AR! NOT KNOWN TO CUT 
OR DISPLACE THI! HOST RECENT 
ALLUVIAL Ol!POSITS, BUT HAY BE 
FOUND IN OLOER ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS. 
Cl) GllOUNO-WATl!R SAll.RIER fl1AY 81! 
l'OUHO IN OLOEll. HATElllALS. · 
(i.) G!OLOGICAI. SETTING IN WHICH 
THI! GEOMETRIC RELATIONSHIP TO 
ACTIVE OR POTENTIALLY ACTIVE 
l'AULTS SUGGESTS SHULAR LfVELS 
QI" l'AULT .ACTIVITY. 
SEIS"1LOGICAL 
EAATHQUAU !Pl CENTERS 
ARE ASSICHEO TO IN• 
OIVIDUAL FAULTS WITH 
A HIGH DEGREE OF 
CONl'tOEHC!. 
Al.I GHMENT 0, SOME 
EARTHQUAKE EPICENTERS 
Al.ONG l'AIA. T TRACE, 
BUT LOCATIONS AR!! 
ASSIGNED WI TH A LOW 
OEGR!E OF CONFIDENCE. 
AVAii.AiLE INFORMATION IS INSUfFICI!!NT TO PROVIDE CRITERIA THAT 
AU DfflNITlV! ENOUGH TO !!STABLISH fAULT ACTIVITY. THIS LACK OF 
IHl'ORMATION MAY Bf OUE TO THI! INACTIVITY 01' THE !'AULT OR OU! TO 
A I.ACK 01' INV!STIGATJONS NEEDED TO PROVIDE OEFINITIV!! CRITERIA. 
NO HISTORIC ACTIVITY G!!OHORPHIC FEATURES CHARACTER-
ISTIC 01' ACTIV!! FAULT ZONES ARE 
NOT PRESENT AHO GEOLOGICAL EVI-
DENCE IS AVAl\.A&LE TO INDICATE 
THAT THE FAULT HAS NOT MOVED IN 
THE RECENT PAST ANO RECURRENCE IS 
NOT 1.IKELY DURING A TIME PERIOD 
CONSIDERED SIGNll'ICANT TO THE 
SIT!. AG! OF HOST RECENT FAULT 
Ol'l'S!!T SHOULD ae DOCUMENTED: 
HOLOCEN!!, PLEISTOC!!NE, 
QUATERNARY, TERTIARY, ETC. 





create high-angle normal faults which are associated with crustal 
extension and thinning. The Reno-Sparks area and the Basin and Range 
Province in general is characterized by normal faults (Bingler, 1976). 
Transform plate boundaries like the San Andreas fault zone of Cali-
fornia are characterized by vertically dipping lateral or strike-slip 
faults. These faults chiefly have horizontal displacements along verti-
cal fault planes. Dip-slip and oblique-slip faults (Figure 5) have 
significant vertical components of movement and may produce fault 
scarps in areas of normal and reverse faulting. Careful study of the 
morphology of fault scarps can reveal the number of distinct episodes 
of movement which have occurred. Analysis of the ages of displaced soil 
and rock units dates the movements on faults. 
Table IV of Slemmons and McKinney ( 1977) illustrates the close 
relationship between surface fault activity and earthquake magnitude 
and recurrence. This figure dramatically illustrates the importance of 
quantitative measurements of deformation rates and consequent fault 
activity. Ryall and Van Wormer (1980) have determined the following 
relationship between fault-zone length and earthquake magnitude for 
fault ruptures of eight historic earthquakes in the Western Great Basin: 
log L (km) = 0.4329M 1.388; 
L = Fault zone lenght; M Richter magnitude. 
Quan ti tati ve values of the lenghth of fault zones which might rupture 
in a single event are thus critical for prediction of the magnitude of 
potential earthquakes. 
It is imperative that planners have concrete quantitative def-
initions of terms like "active fault" and "capable fault". Slemmons and 
Normal fault 






Left lateral normal fault 
(Left oblique normal fault} 
(e} 
Left lateral reverse fault 
(Left oblique reverse fault} 
Diagrammatic sketches of fault types (a) names of components. (b) normal 
fault. ( c) reverse fault. (d) left-lateral strike-slip fault. (e) left-lateral normal fault. (f) left-lateral 
reverse fault. 
Figure 3. Fault types 
(From Bolt et al, 1977) 
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TABLE IV 
FAULT ACTIVITY AND EARTHQUAKE REOCCURRENCE 
(From Slemmons and McKinney, 1977) 
PROJECTED EARTHQUAKE ACTIVITY 
SOURCE FAULT MAXIMUM HISTORIC EARTHQUAKE ESTIMATED RECURRENCE 
(DISTANCE FROM SITE) (DATE, MAGNITUDE, LOCATION) MAGNITUDE l N YEAAsx>rn 
MARCH 12, 1939 8-l/2'C:C 
8.1 8 100-500 
FAULT A 38 MILES FROM SITE 7-1/2 60-150 
INTENSITY X 7 so-100 




JULY 12, 1840 1-112xx 
6.5-7.0 (ESTIMATED) 7 100-500 
FAULT B 20 MILES FROM SITE 6-1/2 50-100 
INTENSITY IX-X 6 25-50 
14 HILES FROM SITE OCTOBER 21, 1868 5-1/2 10-20 
6.0-6.5 (ESTIMATED) 5 5-10 
INTENSITY I X•X 
JULY 4, 1864 7-l/2Xx 
FAULT C 6.5-7.0 (ESTIMATED) 7 100-500 
16 MILES FROM SITE 6-1/2 50-100 
11 MILES FROM SITE INTENSITY VIII-IX 6 25-50 
5-1/2 10-25 
5 5-10 
DECEMBER 17, 1890 7-1/22"' 
FAULT D 7.0-7.5 (ESTIMATED) 7 250-500 
31 MILES FRO~ SITE 6-1/2 100-200 
4 MILES FROM SITE INTENSITY IX-X 6 50-100 
OCTOBER 24, 1955, MAGNITUDE 5.4 5-1/2 20-50 
6 MILES FROM SITE 5 10-20 
"FAULTS ANO RECURRENCE DATA ARE HYPOTHETICAL, INTENDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES 
ONLY. 
XXMAXIMUM CREDIBLE EARTHQUAKE: THE MAXIMUM EARTHQUAKE THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT APPEARS 
CAPABLE OF OCCURRING UNDER THE PRESENTLY KNOWN GEOLOGIC FRAMEWORK. 
XXXTHE RECURRENCE INTERVALS ARE A NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF PAST FAULT ACTIVITY ANO 
ARE NOT A PREDICTION OF FUTURE ACTIVITY; THEY DO INDICATE THE RELATIVE ACTIVITY 
BETWEEN DIFFERENT FAULT ZONES. 
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McKinney (1977) define the following essential attributes of an Active 
Fault: 
"1. Active faults have been offset during the present seis-
motectonic regime [present type of deformation]. 
2. Active faults have the probability or potential for future 
renewal or recurrence of offset. 
3. Active faults have evidence of recent activity, as may be 
shown by physiographic evidence. 
4. Active faults may have associated earthquake activity." 
In addition to these elements, most workers specify that an active 
fault have Holocene displacement (within the last 10,000 years), accord-
ing to Slemmons and McKinney (1977). A capable fault is defined by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( 1975) as a fault displaced once 
during the last 500,000 years. A dead fault is a fault that "was active 
during an earlier orogenic period, but is not active within the present 
tectonic regime and accordingly does not offset late Cenozoic deposits 
or surf aces , and is not seismically active" (Slemmons and McKinney, 
1977). Other definitions of all these terms are exhaustively summarized 
by Slemmons and McKinney (1977) in their excellent review of the 
subject. 
Workers such as McKinney (1976), Trexler (1976) and Bingler 
(1974) in the Reno-Sparks area have classified the faults according to 
most recent sedimentary erosion surface or deposit cut. Such classifica-
tions can only put maximum ages on particular faults but are an honest 




The Reno-Sparks area lies at the fault-shattered contact between 
the Basin and Range and the Sierra Nevada Tectonic provinces. West of 
the area, a westerly tilted, north-south trending block of thick Sierra 
Nevadan crystalline rocks forms the majestic Sierras of Eastern Cali-
fornia (Slemmons, 1967). East of the area, much lower elevations 
prevail over a vast region of Nevada, Utah and Arizona which are 
collectively called the Great Basin (Longwell et al, 1969). The preva-
lence of numberous small NW to N-trending closed basins and adjacent 
mountain ranges has caused the Great Basin to be referred to also as 
the Basin and Range Province. The ranges are generally up-thrown fault 
blocks (horsts), while basins are almost invariably down-dropped fault 
blocks (grabens) with bounding faults of late Cenozoic age. The faults 
are thought to be the result of both tensional and lateral forces 
associated with the San Andreas transform plate boundary (Slemmons, 
1967). These forces have tended to pull apart and thin the crust of the 
Basin and Range Province, creating the lower elevations characteristic 
of the Great Basin. 
23 
ROCK UNITS 
Areas uplifted in the northern and northwest part of the Reno-
Sparks area are composed of Mesozoic metamorphic and intrusive rocks, 
whereas younger rocks characterize the down-thrown central and south-
eastern parts of the area. The oldest rocks are Triassic and or 
Jurassic-aged metavolcanic and metasedimentary rocks of the Peavine 
sequence which are intruded by younger Mesozoic granodiorities and 
quartz monzoni tes. Cenozoic volcanic rocks overlie the older crystal-
line rocks and dominate outcrops adjacent to the sediment-filled basin 
which holds the main cities. 
Volcanism in the area began with eruption of great sheets of ash-
flow tuff of the Hartford Hill Rhyolite Tuff about 29 million years ago 
(latest Oligocene; Bingler and Bonham, 1976). Sedimentary breccias, 
formed by erosion of the Hartford Hill rocks, were covered in the 
middle Miocene by pyroxene andesite lava flows and volcanic mudflows of 
the Al ta Formation. Granitic and rrhyoli tic plugs intruded the Al ta 
Formation prior to emplacement of hornblende-biotite andesite flows and 
intrusives of the late Miocene Kate Peak Formation (Bonham, 1969):(Bing-
ler and Bonham, 1976). By late Miocene or early Pliocene, significant 
movement on Basin and Range faults produced numberous intermontane lake 
basins where diatomi tes of the sandstone of Hunter Creek accumulated. 
Pleistocene deposits filled in the developing basins during melting of 
mountain glaciers in interglacial times and these gravels and sands 
serve with Holocene alluvial deposits to demarcate intervals of Quater-
nary of faulting (see Bingler and Bonham 1976 for detailed description 
of these deposits). 
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STRUCTURAL GEOLOGY 
The latest deformation episode in the Reno-Sparks area began in 
the late Miocene and has continued into the present. Deformation has 
occurred chiefly by normal faulting (Bingler, 1976) but also includes 
upwarping of mountain blocks and downwarping of basins with faults at 
the flexures of these movements (Bingler and Bonham, 1976). The Truckee 
River crosses through the downwarped structural basin of the Truckee 
Meadows which separates the anticlinal uplift of the northern Carson 
Range from the dome-like upwarp of the Peavine block. Dominant fault 
sets trend N20°E to N45°E in a zone 3 km ( 2 mi) wide extending NW-SE 
through the area (Bingler and Bonham, 1976). A secondary set at N30°W 
to N60 °w and north- and east-trending faults also occur in the area. 
Quaternary movements on a few faults in these zones can be demonstrated 
and a very few cut younger Quaternary or Holocene deposits (Bingler, 
1976). Maximum total offset in the Quaternary deposits was llm ( 35 
feet) in the Virginia Lake Graben (Bingler and Bonham, 1976) • Lengths 
of individual fault's range from 0.4 km (0.25 mi) to 0.65 km (0.4 mi) 
with 90% less than 3 km ( 1. 86 mi) in lenghth with dip-slip displace-
ments of a few meters. A large number of these small faults may have 
formed in a single major seismic event (Bingler and Bonham, 1976). 
Bingler ( 1976) concludes that few fault scarps in the area are the 
result of recurrent offsets on the same fault plane and that fault 
activity younger than 80,000 years old has decreased somewhat relative 
to activity between latest Miocene and 80,000 years ago. 
Trexler (personal communication, 1980) and Cordova ( 1969), how-
ever, note that continuations of fault zones of Reno-Sparks further 
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south have evidence of multiple movements. In view of the excellent 
exposures of fault scarps to the south of Reno-Sparks re la ti ve to 
scarps in urbanized areas, their observations may be more accurate than 
those of Bingler. 
SEISMIC HAZARD MAPS 
Plate 1 is a composite of four seismic hazard maps prepared by 
the Nevada Bureau of Mines for the Reno-Sparks area. These maps were 
produced for general planning purposes and each has a disclaimer 
stating that they are not intended for geologic hazard potential for 
individual sites. They do, however, show areas of potentially unstable 
ground which might be sensitive to earthquake activity. Each map also 
summarizes the entent of fault scarps with some indication of the 
maximum age since the last movement on the faults. The two southerly 
parts of the composite map and the east section were prepared by 
Trexler (1976) and McKinney (1976). They classify faults only as 
potentially active (i.e., Quaternary in age or approximately, post-two 
million years) or as pre-Quaternary in age. The northern-most map, 
which takes in the most populous part of the Reno-Sparks area, was 
produced by E.C. Bingler (1974) and shows a much more detailed classifi-
cation of maximum age of last fault movements. Bingler' s map also 
contains a much more detailed classification of shaking potential of 
various foundation materials. Viewing the maps as a composite allows 
one to see with a little extrapolation how Bingler's detailed classifi-
cation might apply to adjacent parts of Trexler and McKinney's maps. 
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The utility of the composite is thus much greater than the individual 
maps taken alone. 
Bingler' s ( 1974) seismic hazard map classifies the faults ac-
cording to the youngest deposit that they cut. Faul ts which cut older 
deposits are not, however, necessarily older than faults which cut 
younger deposits. In all likelihood, many of the faults in a particular 
zone formed at about the same time, regardless of what age deposit they 
happen to cut. The weakness of Bingler' s map and of all the maps is 
that none of them makes an attempt to classify the faults according to 
freshness of scarp morphology. Also, none of the maps indicate whether 
fault scarps show evidence of multiple movements. Bingler (1974) makes 
the observation that few faults in the Reno quadrangle area appear to 
be the result of multiple movements. Apparently he could find little 
tendency for ground rupture to occur preferentially along established 
fault planes. One might conclude that they very weak Quaternary de-
posits which form the cover over much of the Reno-Sparks area, are so 
easily deformed that fault planes are not markedly weaker than adjacent 
unbroken ground. Cordova ( 1969) in his study of faults in the Mount 
Rose area to the south of Reno found three to five movements on 
individual faults in Holocene time. Trexler (personal communication, 
1978) noted multiple off sets on individual faults in his map area, as 
well. This casts doubt on Bingler's (1974) conclusions. 
It may be profitable for planning purposes to assume that ground 
failure from faulting and from severe shaking near a fault may occur 
anywhere in a particular zone of faults. A zone could be defined as an 
area containing a swarm of surface faults sharing approximately the 
same trend. This approach carries the tacit assumption that swarms of 
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surface faults in weak sediments overlie a deep fault or faults which 
tend to move along established fault planes in strong bedrock. This 
assumption makes it necessary to consider broad areas on indi victual 
faults. While inconvenient to builders, such a conservative approach 
may be justified in areas where a great many lives may be lost if 
ground failure and severe shaking were to occur. 
Three highly active zones or swarms of faults are immediately 
apparent on the hazard map. Each zone contains individual faults which 
cut sediments younger than the last glacial deposits. Zone I may be 
called the Veterans Hospital - State Hospital Zone and contains six 
scarps with subparallel trends at N60°E. Zone I faults cut the youngest 
alluvium on the map at the Truckee River and near the Sparks High 
School. Zone II may be called the Virginia Lake - Anderson School Zone 
and contains about fifteen north-trending scarps in populated areas. 
The youngest alluvium in the map area is cut at Virginia Lake by two 
faults of Zone II. Zone III may be called the Peavine School-Clayton 
High School Zone. It contains about seven scarps in populated areas 
with a general trend of N45°E (see Plate 1). Post-Pleistocene pediment 
gravels are cut by faults of Zone III at the Towler School, Clayton 
High School and the Warner School. (See Plate 1). 
Zones I and II intersect in the Billinghurst Jr. High School -
Veterans Hospital area. It is likely that this may be a very high-risk 
area for severe shaking, al though it is mostly underlain by sediments 
with only moderate tendencies toward ground failure (Luza, 1974). 
Similar moderately comp~tent sediments underlie most of Zone I and much 
of Zone II (Luza, 1974). Zone III, however, is underlain by less 
compentent sediments than those of Zones I and II, and has much steeper 
slopes. 
. . 
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Generalized map of late Ceno-zoic structural features of the western Great Basin (Wright. 
1976), together with epicenters of small earthquakes for 1969 to 1978 (dots) and approximate rupture 
zones of major historic earthquakes (stippled areas, with year of main shock). Note: seismic network 
coverage was not uniform for the period of observation; best coverage was in areas around Reno and 
between Walker and Mono lakes. 
Figure 4. Major fault zones of Nevada 
(From Ryall and Van Wormer, 1980) 
28 
29 
LIKELIHOOD OF A LARGE EARTHQUAKE 
Most seismologists consider earthquakes of magnitude 7 and great-
er to be "major" earthquakes, capable of causing severe damage to works 
of man. It is very important to quantify the probability of occurrence 
of such major earthquakes in the Reno-Sparks area in order to achieve a 
real is tic assessment of the risk engendered by the faults shown in 
Plate I. 
The major fault zones of Figure 6 are part of the very active 
Eastern Sierra Zone. Ryall (1977), Wallace (1978), and Ryal! and Van 
Wormer (1980) have identified this zone as one with a potential for a 
large earthquake in the near future. Ryall (1977) and Ryall and Van 
Wormer ( 1980) conclude that large earthquakes in the Basin-and-Range 
province have a recurrence interval on the order of thousands of years. 
While this may seem reassuring, they point out that the Reno-Sparks 
area is in a dangerously active phase of this cycle of movement which 
occurs every 2,000 to 4,000 years, according to fault morphology 
studies by Cordova (1969) on faults of Zone II in the Mount Rose area. 
The Reno-Sparks area occupies an anomalous "gap" in the pattern of 
historic seismici ty in the Western Great Basin (Ryal 1 and Van Wormer, 
1980). This may indicate that stress has been building up to a 
dangerous level here, so that release in the form of a large earthquake 
is imminent. Pease (1979) estimates that the most recent major movement 
on faults parallel to those of Zone II in the Carson City area to the 
south was just over a century ago, but Ryall and Van Wormer ( 1980) 
allude to other evidence placing the event at times ranging from 1,000 
to 2, 000 years ago. If the latter hypothesis is true, then Zone II 
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faults, and possibly other faults, could be ready for a major movement 
in the near future. 
Recent statistical analyses of earthquake frequency in the Sierra 
Nevada-Great Basin boundary zone (SNGBZ) by Ryall and Van Wormer (1980) 
and Van Wormer and Ryall ( 1980) lend additional support to the hypo-
thesis that this zone may be ready for a large earthquake. They show 
that historic earthquakes in the Basin and Range have been preceded by 
a moderate increase in seismici ty within or in the vicinity of an 
impending rupture zone. Figures 5 and 6 show plots of the frequency of 
earthquakes along various parts of the SNGBZ from 1970 to 1979. Van 
Wormer and Ryall ( 1980) suggest that overall increase in earthquake 
frequency in the SNGBZ with time and dramatic increase in frequency of 
earthquakes during 1978-1979 could correspond to foreshocks signaling 
that a major earthquake is imminent along the SNGBZ. They point out 
that the 70-km-long fault zone along the eastern flank of the Carson 
Range south of Reno has clusters of earthquakes at both ends and could 
generate a major earthquake (Figure 6). Putting 70 km into the equation 
of Ryall and Van Wormer (1980) yields a maximum earthquake magnitute of 
7. 5. The Dog Valley fault in the Truckee area west of Reno is 25 km 
long and could generate a magnitude 6. 4 earthquake (Ryall and Van 
Wormer, 1980) • 
Whereas Ryal 1 and Van Wormer ( 1980) and Van Wormer and Ryal 1 
( 1980) discuss earthquake magnitudes in al 1 fault zones surrounding 
Reno-Sparks, they do not treat individual zones within the cities. 
Using Ryall and Van Wormer's ( 1980) equation and fault zone lengths 
from the seismic hazard maps, Zone I faults ( 9. 6 km; 6 miles long) can 
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Earthquake occurrence in the Sierra Nevada-Great Basin boundary zone as a function of 
time and latitude. Size of symbols is proportional to magnitude; location of zone shown on Figure ll. 
Figure 5. Earthquake occurrence in the SNGBZ 






Energy released by earthquakes in the Sierra Nevada-Great Basin boundary zone as a 
function of time and distance toward the northwest along the zone. A(2.0), logarithm of the n:.unber of 
M2.0 earthquakes that would be equivalent to total energy released by earthquakes within grid square. 
Number of earthquakes were smoothed with a triangular tilter before log NC2.0) was calculated. Energy 
was determined for each earthquake using log E • 11.8 + 1.5 M (Richter. 1958). 
Figure 6. Earthquake energy in the SNGBZ 
(From Van Wormer and Ryall, 1980) 
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long) can have a 5.6 magnitude earthquake; Zone III faults (11.2 km; 7 
miles long) can have a 5. 5 magnitude earthquake and, should all three 
zones become involved in a single seismic event, their combined lengths 
(38.4 km; 24 miles) would yield a maximum probable earthquake of 
magnitude 6.9. 
Fault zone lengths for all of these estimates are limited by the 
map coverage. Because nearly all of these zones probably entend out of 
the map area, larger maximum magnitudes are probable. A conservative 
planner would be wise to assume that a Richter 7 or greater magnitude 
earthquake is possible in the Reno-Sparks area. 
ESTIMATES OF GROUND ACCELERATION 
Owing to lack of published data on site-specific ground accelara-
tion estimates for the Reno-Sparks area, no definitive estimates are 
listed here. Ideally, possible accelerations attributable to maximum 
credible earthquakes from all fault zones in and around the Reno-Sparks 
urban complex should be estimated for each geologic setting. Ryall 
( 1973) estimates that a maximum ground acceleration of 0. 64 gravities 
is possible in the region within 100 kilometers of Reno-Sparks from a 
Richter 7 or greater magnitude earthquake. Such an earthquake would 
probably have a predominant period of 0. 3 seconds and 30 seconds of 
strong ground motion (Ryall, et al., 1973). 
Should an earthquake of this magnitude occur in Reno-Sparks, 
these ground motion estimates may be used as a rough guideline. Van 
Wormer and Ryall (1980), however, indicate that the method of estimat-
ing these ground motions probably leads to high estimates for areas 
geologically similar to Reno-Sparks. 
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MOGUL LANDSLIDE - TRUCKEE RIVER 
West of Reno, outside the study area, is the Mogul landslide com-
plex, which foots into the Truckee River. (See Figure 1). This area has 
been active in 1940 and 1964 and is currently active, according to 
Trexler (personal communication, 1978). If this slide area were reacti-
vated during an earthquake, the river could become dammed by the 
landslide. Water would build up until it overtopped the landslide, 
releasing a torrent of water and debris which could cause a large-scale 
flood in the Reno-Sparks area. 
CHAPTER IV 
STATUS OF EARTHQUAKE CONTINGENCY IN NEVADA 
Earthquakes are natural hazards having a potential for impact in 
terms of damage to life, property, and economic loss. Based on an 
analysis of geologic data of earthquakes, the U.S. has been divided 
into seismic "risk zones". Zone values range from 0 (least risk) to 4 
(highest risk). Risk zones for the U.S. are shown in Figure 9. Most of 
western Nevada is in zone 3 and 4. The last major earthquake (magnitude 
7.1) in Nevada occurred in 1954 in the Dixie Valley area, but due to 
its remote location, little damage was done. If it had occurred in an 
urban area, more attention would have been paid to the problem of 
seismic hazards in Nevada. However, in 1971, a large earthquake oc-
curred in San Fernando, California, which caused over one-half billion 
dollars worth of damage and alerted the public, at least in the West, 
to the realities of earthquake hazards. 
To date, there is no known way to prevent earthquakes. All that 
we can do is try to reduce the hazards that they pose to life and 
property. 
Due to the rapid urban growth in western Nevada, where the 
seismic risk potential is high, Governor Mike O'Callaghan created an Ad 
Hoc Panel in 1978 to study ways of lessing the damage that might be 
caused by an earthquake. The Ad Hoc Panel came to several broad 












































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Nevada lies in a region of high seismic activity. The extent 
of the hazard is growing because of the rapidly growing population, 
living and working in structures that are not adequately designed for a 
seismic event. 
2. With few exceptions, earthquake hazard-related planning in 
Nevada is inadequate. The high-risk potential demands effective plans 
for disaster preparedness, disaster response, mitigation and land use. 
3. There is no overall program focusing on seismic research and 
data collection. The University system through federal funding has done 
significant work, but much more is needed. 
4. There is no coordinated program related to earthquake hazards 
between public and private entities in Nevada. The Ad Hoc Panel 
provided a temporary focal point, and its activities served to high-
light just how serious the communication and coordination problems are. 
5. The manner and extent to which the counties of Nevada and 
private enterprise deal with the earthquake problem is inadequate. The 
State Legislature and Executive Branch should give serious consider-
ation to this matter and take appropriate actions; failure to do so 
could, in the event of a major earthquake, make State and counties 
liable for damage and loss of life. 
The Ad Hoc Panel at the end of its ten-month study recommended: 
1. Establishment of an independent interdisciplinary Seismic 
Safety Council; 
2. Revision of NRS 278 .160 to require preparation of a seismic 
safety plan as an element of city, county or regional master plans; 
3. Increased funding for the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology 
to accelerate the Bureau's seismic hazard mapping program. If the State 
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is to have a serious program to reduce earthquake hazards, this type of 
data is urgently needed; 
4. The State of Nevada should adopt as State law all the seismic 
provisions of the 1979 Uniform Building code. To date, each county has 
adopted the Uniform Building Code with exceptions, so it is not 
uniformly applied; 
5. Establishment of a center for seismic hazard assessment data 
to achieve and make available all date developed by public and private 
entities within Nevada; 
6. To adopt "Alquist-Priolo Geological Hazards Act" legislation. 
This California act came about as a result of studies of California 
seismic safety problems by the Legislative Joint Commission on Seismic 
Safety and the Governor's Earthquake Council. Experience of losses in 
San Fernando's 1971 earthquake added impetus. The act provides mechan-
isms to reduce loss from surface fault displacement by 
(a) requiring the state geologist to delineate special study 
zones (1/4 mile wide areas on active faults) through a 10 year mapping 
program. 
(b) requiring affected local jurisdictions to regulate devel-
opment programs within the defined zone by withholding development 
permits or change of occupancy permits until geological investigations 
demonstrate that the site is not threatened by surface displacement 
from future faulting 
(c) requiring sellers of any property in special study zones 
to disclose that fact to any prospective buyer 
(d) requiring the owner/developer of zoned lands to obtain 
the required geological reports 
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( e) requiring a fifty-foot standard setback for stuctures 
and regulating the types of buildings permitted (i.e. wooden framed 
ones or two-story homes) 
( f) specifically prohibiting the location of structures of 
human occupancy across active fault traces. 
7. Increase the seismographic station network in order to make 
possible accurate epicenter location of future earthquakes and to 
improve seismic zoning. 
In response to the Ad Hoc Panel, the State Legislature of 1979 ad-
journed without holding even a hearing on the above recommendations. 
The Panel urged Governor List to officially continue the Ad Hoc Panel 
as an interim measure, but this too, fell on deaf ears. 
HAZARD MITIGATION 
Mitigation of seismic hazards includes prevention of new hazards 
and elimination of existing hazards as part of the overall disaster pre-
paredness response. Seismic hazards can be related to: ( 1) unstable 
geologic conditions, ( 2) unsafe structures and ( 3) inadequately de-
signed utility systems. 
The most effective hazard reduction program would be to avoid 
building in areas of high seismic risk. However, this is a very 
difficult problem because urban growth tends to force development of 
potentially hazardous locations, even as awareness of the hazard grows 
more acute. Much can be accomplished by recognition of seismic hazards 
at the planning level. 
Mitigation of seismic hazards can be accomplished by use of ( 1) 
mapping of geologic hazards, ( 2) land-use planning, ( 3) zoning, ( 4) 
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building code requirements, (5) insurance programs, and (6) assessment 
of economic impacts. 
It is important to inventory vital critical, crucial and danger-
ous facilities already within a jurisdiction so that they can be 
incorporated in a plan to eliminate seismic hazards. Vital facilities 
are defined as those required to remain in service following an 
earthquake to care for the safety or health of the public. Examples of 
such facilities are the police and fire departments, hospitals and 
communications centers. These facilities require more design considera-
tions, because their failure will not be tolerated in a disaster. 
Critical facilities are those whose failure would result in loss of 
life, large economic losses and degradation of the environment. Such 
facilities are: electrical power lines and plants, natural gas lines, 
water lines; sewage lines, water and sewage treatment plants, dams, and 
transportation systems. High-occupancy facilities such as schools and 
high-rise buildings are considered to be crucial, while older buildings 
having parapets and facades are seen as dangerous. 
GUIDELINES FOR SITING FACILITIES 
In many cases the safety of a facility can be enhanced by careful 
design criteria and siting. To select a site, certain geological and 
seismic parameters must be known, and this knowledge, in turn, can play 
an important role in the design of the facility. The following are 
considered of paramount importance to aid siting: ( 1) the regional 
geology, (2) degree of activity seismically--how large and how often a 
movement will occur on local faults, amount of displacement associated 
with an event, slip rate, and reccurrence interval of associated 
40 
earthquakes. at various magnitudes; ( 3) history of faulting, ( 4) de-
tailed geology at the site, (5) soils and investigation of the general 
area and site, and ( 6) potential seismic response of the site. It 
should be recognized that there is a difference between hazard and a 
perceived hazard. In some cases, the potential hazard can be controlled 
by care and consideration used in site selection and design. In the 
past, this has not been done, because the hazard has been judged to be 
lower than it is, owing to lack of knowledge and understanding. This 
results in perceived hazards which may be very different from the 
potential hazard (White and Haas, 1975). 
The extent of damage to a structure by ground motion of a given 
intensity will depend on how well the structure was designed to resist 
the induced forces. There is a lack of seismic design standards for the 
utilities and a lack of seismic performance criteria for critical 
facilities which should be remedied. The UBC also does not cover 
systems such as water or electrical distribution; it only covers 
structures such as buildings and tanks. In addition, the utilities in 
Washoe County are privately owned, and self regulation seriously hamp-
ers application of seismic standards. 
All vital, critical and crucial facilities and routes should be 
required to have a geological investigation. This includes both ex-
isting and proposed facilities. To date, due to Federal requirements, 
on-site seismic assessments are currently performed on certain struc-
tures such as nuclear power facilities and darns. These site-specific 
studies are essential for evaluating seismic hazards prior to the 
approval of designs. Buildings and structures need to be inspected 
during construction to check the implementation of the design, and the 
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quality of the design can be partially regulated by licensing of 
architects and engineers. 
Formulation of a land-use plan that is acceptable should be based 
on the economic, social, and political considerations of the area 
involved. Land and building use should generally be based on ( 1) the 
type of occupancy, (2) the type of construction and design, (3) 
structural system and building height, and ( 4) the risk from ground 
deformation. 
Urban areas near faults and in zones of potential seismic risk 
should be zoned for restricted building purposes. Construction in such 
areas needs to be regulated at the state or federal level. Controls 
should be designed to minimize potential casualties and property damage 
whenever economically feasible. There are several options at present 
for the use of such land: (1) wooden frame homes, (2) recreational, (3) 
greenbelts for farms or dairies, or (4) use as natural open spaces. 
During the Alaskan Earthquake of 1964, frame buildings withstood 
a series of shocks that collapsed or damaged beyond repair many other 
buildings. Even under severe circumstances, when ground settlement left 
homes hanging on cliffs, the frame houses did not usually break up. 
Brick chimneys, however, generally broke at the roof line. 
In the Reno-Sparks area, there is, as yet, no seismic zoning. 
Currently, the City Building Departments require that the builder prove 
that the building, if in a potentially dangerous area of strong ground 
motion, will continue to stand. Dr. Douglas, at the University of 
Nevada (in Reno) Engineering School, is presently working with the 
Building Codes Inspector, Mr. Harrington, on rewriting the building 
code. It is felt that vital and critical facilities in the Reno-Sparks 
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area, built prior to 1976, may be unable to continue functioning after 
a major earthquake. 
BUILDING CODES 
Most loss of 1 if e, injuries, and property damage during earth-
quakes results from structural failures. Building codes represent the 
minimum design and construction standards needed to ensure public 
heal th and safety. Building codes are the primary tool governments 
possess to reduce seismic risk in structures. The basic philosophy 
behind the Uniform Building Code ( UBC) is that buildings be so con-
structed as to resist without collapsing--but with some structural and 
non-structural damage--major earthquakes of the intensity or severity 
of the strongest earthquakes experienced in California. The intent was 
to minimize the hazard to life and restrict property damage and loss of 
life to reasonable limits. 
Every major destructive earthquake in the U.S. has exposed de-
ficiencies in the design criteria which has subsequently led to mod-
ifications of the UBC. The 1976 UBC code cal ls for a 50% increase in 
lateral seismic loads over that required in the 1970 UBC owing to 
lessons learned from the San Fernando Earthquake of 1971. Older struc-
tures (pre-1950's) were not built to withstand the lateral stress 
imposed by strong ground shaking during major earthquakes. These older 
structures need to be catalogued. Generally, the older the structure 
(except possibly single-story wooden frame buildings), the less likely 
it is to resist an earthquake. This applies especially to buildings 
having walls of non-reinforced brick held together by sand-lime mortar, 
but in general to al 1 multi-storied buildings that do not have steel 
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reinforcements (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973) . Steel reinforce-
ments and shear walls are the most commonly used lateral force resis-
tant systems to date in multi-storied buildings. 
High-rise buildings (over 75 feet in height) are most vulnerable 
to violent seismic stresses. Design of these buildings is critical, 
because failure of these buildings could result in great loss of life 
(Ad Hoc Panel, 1978). In Washoe county, fire codes require buildings 
over 75 feet tall, or having five stories, to have a sprinkler system 
or an alarm system with heat and smoke detectors directly tied into.the 
fire station. This code applies to al 1 new and existing high-rise 
buildings. 
In the Reno metropolitan area, there are many different types of 
buildings. Past designs fal 1 into three general categories ( 1) those 
with no considerations for seismic loads, (2) those where some risk was 
recognized, and some increase in the lateral load design was made, and 
( 3) those which were specifically designed for a site, taking into 
account the seismic loads as established by a geological investigation. 
At any intensity of shaking not all older buildings will respond in the 
same way; it is necessary to check each building's seismic resistance 
individually. 
The Ad Hoc Panel suggested that the requirement of remodeling per-
mits be used to implement the correction of deficiencies found in older 
structures. The Ad Hoc Panel further stated that to insure successful 
application of the latest seismic design criteria in the UBC, the use 
of registered architects and engineers be required. Nevada statutes 
require only public works facilities costing over $150,000 to be 
designed by registered professionals. 
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In Washoe County, soil investigations are required for large sub-
divisions and commercial buildings (Harrington, 1976). The lack of geo-
logical and soil investigations prior to building of vital and critical 
facilities is a major problem which must be remedied, if these facili-
ties are to be relied upon during a major earthquake. It is imperative 
that the 1979 UBC be adopted without exceptions. The new code's seismic 
design provisions are considered to be the best available. 
CHAPTER V 
LIFELINE INVENTORY 
There are a number of essential and emergency facilities in the 
Reno-Sparks community which serve the public. In the event of a natural 
disaster, such as a high-rnagni tude earthquake, it is irnperati ve that 
these facilities continue to operate since they would be the lifelines 
of the stricken community. The term lifeline for the purposes of this 
paper is considered to include: fire stations, police departments, 
hospitals, ambulance services, communications, electrical power, gas, 
water, sewage treatment and transportation. 
The Ad Hoc Panel of Nevada on seismic hazard mitigation divided 
the lifelines into four classes: 
1. Vital: fire department, police department, hospitals and com-
munications 
2. Critical: electrical power lines and plants, natural gas pipe-
lines and storage plants, water and sewage lines and treat-
ment plants, transportation and darns 
3. Crucial: schools and hi-rise buildings 
4. Dangerous: older buildings, and buildings with parapets and 
facades 
Little attention has been given to the design of lifelines until 
the recent disasters in Anchorage and San Fernando, where large earth-
quakes struck urban areas. The amount of useful data collected on 
life-line performance is small compared to the volumes of research done 
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on earthquake engineering. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake disaster 
has brought earthquake planning and mitigation to the public attention, 
and has led to many improvements in building codes and design. 
This paper is meant to be an inventory of vital, critical and 
crucial facilities. Facilities will be evaluated in terms of general 
problems which occurred in past earthquakes, the number of facilities 
available, the capabilities of the facilities, the buildings housing 
them, and their location relative to known faults, and other features 
which could be potentially hazardous during seismic shaking. Emergency 
action plans and agencies will be discussed in a separate section. 
VITAL FACILITIES 
Vital facilities are those required to sustain life and property 
during and after a seismic condition. 
Fire Stations and Services 
When an earthquake occurs in a metropolitan area, subsequent 
fires can be a greater hazard than the strong ground motion felt during 
the earthquake. In both the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and the 
Tokyo earthquake of 1923, fires caused significantly more damage than 
did the earthquake's shaking. In the 1906 event, the fire broke out 
immediately after the earthquake and raged for three days, burning 508 
blocks of the city (Bolt, 1978) . To date, this fire has been the only 
major fire disaster associated with an earthquake in the United States. 
The rapid spread of fire after an earthquake is due to: ( 1) 
strong ground motion disrupting the water system, ( 2) lowered water 
pressure, and ( 3) the highly combustible nature of buildings lacking 
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fire protection devices, such as ceiling water sprinklers. 
Fire fighting capabilities and rescue can be hampered by debris 
blocking streets adjacent to the fire and by the rupturing of major 
access routes. The season and weather can also act to either intensify 
or help to mitigate a fire with high winds, rain and the availability 
of water. Today's high-rise structures pose specific problems in fire 
control, especially when elevators become inoperative, debris fills the 
stairways and fire ladders cannot reach the upper stories (EERI, 1977). 
Fire hazard can be reduced by planning and fire drills. Extra 
equipment should be stored in a seismically safe building in an area 
having easy, quick access in the event of a disaster. It is also 
important for fire fighters to be able to get to their station, and 
imperative that the station remain functional after an earthquake. 
~· Reno has nine fire stations within its city boundaries. In 
the event of a major disaster, they could be supplemented by the Stead 
Facility fire station (ten miles to the northwest), Truckee Meadows 
Fire District (Washoe County) , and by outlying volunteer fire depart-
ments (Miller, 1978). 
Station 1 was located in downtown Reno at 136 W. Commercial Row. 
Until 1976, it was the main station and housed the communications 
network for the city. The building, a two-story unreinforced brick 
structure, was approximately 75 years old. Portions of the building 
were designated unsafe by the city Building Inspector, since it was 
considered to be a prime candidate for collapse in the event of strong 
ground motion. Collapse of this structure could have led to the loss of 
trained personnel, the city's communication network and fire fighting 
48 
equipment (two pump trucks and one aerial ladder truck) . Therefore, a 
new main station was built in 1976. 
The new station, at 200 Evans Street (part of the Reno Public 
Safety Center) is in a three-story reinforced concrete building poured-
in-place, having shear walls and a basement. It ·is built with a 50% 
higher lateral force than required in the 1970 Uniform Building Code 
(Van Meter, 1976). A soils investigation carried out on the site f·ound 
that the liquefaction potential for the area was nil (Van Meter, 1976). 
This facility is located on the north side of the Truckee River, giving 
it quick access to most of the downtown Reno business area. The 
building also houses the Communication office for the city. 
Station 2, situated at 495 Merril Avenue, is a two-story rein-
forced concrete building approximately 28 years old. It is equipped 
with two pump trucks and one aerial ladder truck. This station is not 
close to any known faults, but is on potentially unstable out wash 
deposits (Bingler, 197 4) . There is some potential for damage, due to 
the age of the building (see Uniform Building Code section) and the 
soils. 
Station 3, at 532 South Virginia Street, is approximately 63 
years old. It is a one-story brick building resting on a mortared stone 
foundation. The station is located within 100 feet ( 30 meters) of a 
potentially active fault scarp (fault number 26) and sits on potential-
ly unstable out-wash deposits. Due to the age of the station, it could 
collapse during strong ground motion or be severely damaged. This 
station houses one pumper truck, and would be the main station to 
respond to fires in the south central part of Reno, because the bridges 
crossing the Truckee River are expected to collapse during a major 
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earthquake (Hay, 1978). 
Station 4 at 1090 Ralston near the University of Nevada, is 
approximateiy 26 years old. It is a one-story reinforced brick struc-
ture which houses two pump trucks. Fault number 5 lies one mile to the 
northwest and the soils at the station are moderately stable (Bingler, 
1974). This station is expected to survive a major earthquake relative-
ly undamaged. 
Station 5 at Mayberry Drive is a one-story reinforced cinder 
block building with an adjoining four-story tower. It is 18 years old 
and houses two pump trucks. This station is within one-half mile of two 
potentially active faults (fault number 13 and 14) and is on potential-
ly unstable outwash deposits (Bingler, 1974). Some damage could occur, 
especially to the towers, during strong ground motion. 
Station 6, located at 969 Gentry Way, is approximately 15 years 
old and houses two-pump trucks. The building is a one-story reinforced 
cinder block structure. In 1976, station 9 was built adjacent to 
Station 6. It is a two-story reinforced concrete and shear-wall struc-
ture. The exterior of the new building has a ceramic glaze which is 
brittle. While falling pieces could harm people outside the building 
during an earthquake, the glaze will not affect the structural strength 
of the building (Miller, 1978). The soils underlying this station are 
composed of potentially liquefiable fine sand silt (Bingler, 1974) 
which could undergo severe ground motion and surf ace dislocation during 
a major earthquake. This station could, in addition, be subjected to 
flooding by the Truckee River. (See section on transportation, regard-
ing airport location.) 
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Station 7 is a reinforced one-story brick structure situated at 
300 Skyline Boulevard. It is approximately 14 years old and is equipped 
with one pumper and one aerial ladder truck. The station is within 100 
feet ( 30 meters) of a potentially active fault (fault number 19) on 
relatively stable soils (Trexler, 1976). Damage incurred here would 
probably be minor. 
Station 8 was constructed in 1971, at 3600 Kings Row. The station 
has one pumper truck and is a single-story reinf arced concrete build-
ing. The service area is composed of homes. The station sits on 
relatively stable bedrock near fault number 2 (Bingler, 1974). 
Except for station 3, al 1 the fire stations in both Reno and 
Sparks were constructed in conformance with the Uniform Building code 
requirements for lateral forces (relating to earthquakes) at the time 
of their construction (Van Meter, 1976). 
In general, stations located in the northwest parts of Reno could 
become isolated if fracturing occurred along the older fault lines. 
Other stations could have the double problem of low water pressure in 
addition to access problems caused by street fracturing. The fire 
hydrants in the Reno-Sparks community are connected to Sierra Pacific 
Power Company's water tanks (Firth, 1978). In the event of a fire, 
these tanks could supply 75, 000 gallons per minute of water if they 
remain functional. The fire department could reduce the flow of water 
around ruptured mains by closing and opening the proper valves (see 
waterpipe section under Sierra Pacific Power) . There are contingency 
plans to pump directly from the river if no water is available in the 
pipelines. 
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Sparks. The city of Sparks has three fire stations. The depart-
ment headquarters are located on "C" Street and 12th Avenue. This 
station is a two-story reinforced concrete building which underwent 
major remodeling in 1970 (Richards, 1976). The potentially active 
faults are within one-half mile ( 800 meters) of this station (fault 
numbers 45 and 44) and the soils in this area according to C. E. 
Bingler's map (1974) are potentially unstable. It is possible under wet 
conditions or with amplified ground motion that damage to this building 
could occur during a major seismic event. 
Station 2, at the corner of Baring and N. Truckee Lane, built in 
1975, is a single-story reinforced masonry building. This station is 
situated in an area of high ground water where liquefaction could be a 
problem. 
Station 3, on South 21st Street, at present is unmanned and is 
used for storage of reserve fire trucks and equipment (Brown, 1978) . 
This station was built in 1953, and is a one-story reniforced masonry 
building with an adjoining three-story tower. In the event that the 
I-80 bridge collapsed, this station, if manned, could be the only 
Sparks station serving the southern part of the town. The station is 
within 200 yards (200 meters) of a potentially active fault (number 45) 
and is on potentially unstable outwash deposits. It is likely that this 
station would sustain damage during strong ground motion. 
The Sparks Fire Department has the following emergency equipment: 
one aerial ladder truck and five pump trucks. It employs approximately 
39 full-time people with 15 active volunteers. In addition to the fire 
department equipment, local construction firms have been contracted to 
supply heavy equipment to enhance the rescue capabilities, and to aid 
in clearing major escape routes under the direction of the fire 
52. 
department. Any building built in Sparks which is higher than the aeri-
al ladder truck's capabilities of 75 feet ( 12 meters) is required by 
law to have internal sprinkler systems. The older buildings in Sparks 
represent few problems because they are only one and two stories high 
(Richards, 1976). 
The presence of a tank storage farm (oil and gas) in Sparks has 
prompted the fire department to implement special plans and methods to 
handle any fire or tank rupture within the tank farm. Fire drills are 
held three days each year in cooperation with the Southern Pacific 
Pipeline Company (Richards, 1976). 
A written procedure exists specifically for an earthquake emer-
gency including ways to obtain medical aid (for those rescued or 
burned), food, shelter and for additional aid from other agencies 
outside the City of Sparks (Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District 
and the City of Reno), (Brown, 1978). 
Police Departments 
In the event of a major earthquake, the main function of the 
police department will be ( 1) traffic control coordination with the 
hospitals, ambulance services and fire department, ( 2) prevention of 
looting, and (3) aid in helping to extricate the injured and dead from 
debris. The police department is considered to be vital and it must 
remain functional after a seismic disaster. It is therefore imperative 
that the buildings housing this facility be designed to withstand 
strong ground motion. 
Reno. The Reno Police Department was built to the Uniform Build-
ing Code of 1950 at the northwest corner of High and Second Streets. It 
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across the Truckee River from the new Public Safety Center. The 
building is constructed of reinforced concrete and shear walls. Adjoin-
ing the north side of the older building is a newer three-story 
reinforced concrete structure with shear walls, built in 1975. This 
addition was designed for a 50% increase in the lateral force load 
above the 1970 Uniform Building Code requirements (Roguemore, et al, 
1976). Both buildings are located fairly close to the Truckee River and 
could be subject to flooding. The soils according to Bingler (1974) are 
potentially unstable outwash deposits. A potentially active fault (num-
ber 27) is within 1, 000 feet ( 300 meters). It is possible that the 
older part of this building could sustain damage during strong ground 
motion. 
A second police station is located next to Fire Station 7, on 
Skyline Boulevard, in the southwest end of Reno (Roguemore, et al 
1976). Due to its location on stable soils near a fault, it may sustain 
only moderate damages. 
Sparks. The Sparks pol ice headquarters is located at the corner 
of 12th and "C" Street, alongside the fire department. This building, 
completed in 1970, is a two-story, reinforced masonry, and shear wall 
structure. It also contains the Sparks Communication Department (Wal-
ker, 1974). There are two potentially active faults within one-half 
mile of this structure, and the soils are potentially unstable. An 
on-site soils investigation should be made and the building should be 
inspected and brought up to 1976 seismic standards, at least. This 
would insure that it remain functional. 
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Hospitals 
Damage to medical facilities was an outstanding feature of the 
1971 San Fernando earthquake. Four major hospitals suffered severe 
damages--the Veterans Administration Hospital, Olive View Hospital, 
Pacoima Memorial Lutheran Hospital , and the Holy Cross Hospital. Dam-
ages to these hospitals incurred three main internal problems: ( 1) 
search and rescue of patients and staff, (2) transferral of patients to 
a safe location, and (3) caring for those who were injured at the site. 
In terms of community response, problems were encountered with: ( 1) 
inoperative emergency rooms, ( 2) failure of electrical power and the 
back-up emergency power, ( 3) blockage of stairways and elevators by 
debris, and ( 4) the loss of supplies, communications and utilities, 
compounded the problems. In addition, the lack of communications led to 
an abundance of patients being sent to overcrowded hospitals instead of 
being sent to hospitals further away who were not crowded; this was 
especially bad when it involved a hospital that was damaged (U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce, 1973). 
Structural designs which were supposedly seismic-resistant some-
times were proved to be inadequate; such was the fate of the Olive View 
Hospital which suffered partial to complete collapse in various struc-
tural parts. 
St. Mary's Hospital - Reno. St. Mary's Hospital is located at 235 
West 6th street. It is a complex of three- and five-story sections, 
constructed with a steel frame having non-bearing reinforced concrete. 
Parts of the complex date back to 1944, the most recent being a 
five-story building finished in 1967 (Erskine, 1978). The hospital is 
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located approximately one mile from any faults. Due to the age of this 
hospital, damage is to be expected, especially in portions older than 
1950. This hospital's geographic location makes it very important, 
since it might be possible that it would the only hospital able to 
serve the entire north side of town, should the bridges over the 
Truckee River collapse (Hay, 1978). This hospital does have emergency 
generating capabilities. 
Veterans Hospital - Reno. The Veterans Hospital administration 
building, at 1000 Locust, consists of two parts: (1) a three-story and 
( 2) a five-story rectangular hospital, constructed of reinforced con-
crete shear walls. The main parts were built in 1947, and an adjacent 
one-story concrete block building houses the emergency generator 
(Teats, 1974). In 1974, an accelerograph was installed by the state on 
the first floor of the complex as part of the seismic monitoring 
network. There are three potentially active faults within one quarter 
of a mile (fault numbers 28, 29, and 30) , which are Part of Zone I. 
Owing to the close proximity of these faults, the age of construction 
and local soils, this facility is likely to be severely damaged and 
possibly rendered useless. 
Washoe Medical Center - Reno. The Center, at the junction of Mill 
and Kirman Avenues, consists of an older two- and three-story rein-
forced masonry building used for storage and a newer (1968) seven-story 
wing constructed of reinforced concrete shear walls. This newer section 
met the 1968 Uniform Building Codes for emergency facilities; however, 
at that time, a dynamic soils analysis was not required. The newer 
building also houses the city's emergency equipment (Gribbon, 1974). 
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This center is within one-half mile of a potentially active fault 
(number 28), is on potentially unstable outwash deposits and is close 
to the Truckee River, which could flood. Washoe County Civil Defense 
expects some damage to occur to this facility, but the hospital should 
remain functional. In 1978, work was being done on a new annex. This 
author noted that the new facility looked much like the Olive View 
Hospital of San Fernando. Further investigation led to the conclusion 
that the design and construction type was the same. The design flaw 
appears to be that the first floor acts as a rigid box and does not 
flex (personal communication, 1978--from an informant who requested to 
remain unnamed). If this information is correct, Washoe Medical Center 
could have serious problems in a major earthquake. 
Nevada State Mental Institute - Sparks. There is only one hos-
pital within the City of Sparks, the Nevada State Mental Hospital, 
located in the southwest corner of town. The institution consists of a 
cluster of 30 buildings whose dates of construction range from 1882 up 
to 1967. A seismic survey during the 1970's found three buildings to be 
unsound; six others are no longer in use and are scheduled to be 
removed (Walker, 1974). None of the buildings are over two stories 
high. Construction appears to be ·of brick, concrete block and cinder 
block. 
The staff is aware of the seismic hazard; however, the existing 
evacuation plan is primarily for fire. The plan is to move the patients 
to another part of the building complex or bus them elsewhere (no 
specific destination). The patient complement ranges from 320 to 370. 
The staff number varies with the shift from 400 to 550 people. 
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This hospital's proximity to a known active fault zone, combined 
with the age and construction of its buildings and high number of 
people (some of whom are incapable of helping themselves) may add up to 
disaster in the event of a strong earthquake. 
Local convalescent centers and medical offices can be used in 
both towns as emergency facilities for outpatient treatment if needed. 
It is apparent that all the hospital facilities in the Reno-Sparks area 
need retrofitting for seismic resistance. 
Ambulance service. In 1976 there were two ambulance services in 
the Reno-Sparks area. The Alert Ambulance Company in Reno is at 395 S. 
Wells Avenue. A fault lineament appears to cut through the lot where 
the ambulances are parked. The lineament runs parallel to three faults 
one mile to the south (fault numbers 28, 29, 30) and fault number 27 is 
also within one-half of a mile. The local soils are potentially 
unstable outwash deposits. In Sparks, the service is located at 680 
Greenbrae Drive. The two services together have five units available. 
Other units from Carson City, Fernley, Tahoe and the Air National 
Guard could be made available in the event of a major disaster. Travel 
time from these areas is approximately one hour, given passable access 
routes. 
Serving the community is also Medic Air Service at 647 N. 
Arlington Avenue. Between this service and local commercial companies, 
there are eight available helicopters. The Air National Guard and Stead 
Facility have seven helicopters which bring the total in the immediate 
area up to fifteen. If the highway system is severely damaged by 
collapsing bridges over the Truckee River, these helicopters could be 
58 
vital to the area (Hay, 1976), since the major hospitals are all 
located south of the river. 
Communications Systems 
Failures of communication systems after earthquakes have in the 
past been due to: ( 1) damaged buildings, ( 2) broken lines, ( 3) equip-
ment damage resulting from lack of bracing, ( 4) system failure due to 
overloading, and (5) lack of commercial electrical power and failure of 
emergency power sources owing to inadequate bracing of equipment (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1973). 
Nevada Bell Telephone Company. Within Nevada, there are three 
routes over which cal ls can be directed: ( 1) microwave station, ( 2) 
underground cross-country cable, and ( 3) above-ground pole lines. In 
Reno, there is a microwave station situated on First Street in the 
downtown area. This facility has been designed to withstand extreme 
earthquake shaking and strong lateral winds (Upton, 1978). It has 
emergency power generation capabilities and battery supplies (Penner, 
1976). Should this station become inoperative, the Reno-Sparks communi-
ty could be without telephone communications. 
Cross-country cables and above-ground lines are susceptible to 
ground movement and should not be relied upon. The Sparks switch 
station is located on Prater Way, west of Pyramid Way. It is a concrete 
block building with a flat roof. If this building were lost, the entire 
city of Sparks would lose its telephone service. 
City of Reno Communications Department. The Communications Depart-
ment is located in the Reno Public Safety Building on the northeast 
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corner of Evans and Second Street. It was built in 1976, conforming to 
the Los Angeles Building Code, which calls for a 50% increase in 
lateral force over the 1970 UBC requirements for emergency facilities. 
It is a reinforced three-story concrete building having shear walls and 
a basement. A soil investigation was made at this site and little 
potential for liquefaction is present here. This stucture also houses 
the new main fire station, vehicle and communication repair facilities, 
a data bank containing maps of all the utility lines throughout Reno 
and floor plans of high rises. A computer is used to monitor local fire 
alarms and keep track of mobile units. 
(Police communication facilities will be considered under Police 
Stations.) 
Public Broadcast Facilities 
The performance of television and radio after an earthquake 
depends on the damage suffered by the buildings housing the studios and 
transmitters. Many stations have mobile ground and air units; however, 
failure of emergency power supplies at the main station could curtail 
transmissions. Usually, several stations in the local area are part of 
the Emergency Broadcast System. These stations, according to federal 
requirements, are seismically designed and should be able to operate 
during and after a disaster (U.S. Department of commerce, 1973). 
The average height of local radio and television broadcast towers 
is 200 feet and they are secured by guy wires. Only two towers within 
the study area posed any potential hazards. These were KOLO tower near 
Pyramid way, and KOH tower at the east end of Prater Way. Both areas 
are subject to seasonal flooding. This, coupled with strong ground 
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motion, could perhaps loosen the guy wires, causing the towers to 
topple. 
Hospital Emergency Communications. The hospital emergency assis-
tance radio network (HEAR) played a key role in minimizing the immedi-
ate post-earthquake medical problems in the San Fernando earthquake 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973). Although some equipment was des-
troyed in certain hospitals, such as the Olive View Hospital and 
Veterans Administration Hospital, this California system enabled med-
ical teams, supplies and equipment to be ordered from other hospitals, 
and it permitted the coordination of patient transfers to alleviate 
patient overloading problems. The network often became the hospitals' 
only link to outside community agencies. Such a system needs to be set 
up for the Reno-Sparks area, tying the hospitals directly into each 
other, the ambulance services, the police, fire departments and Civil 
Defense disaster center. 
Others. Ham operators, local CB, and two-way mobile radio systems 
of the local population could also be helpful in rescue and disaster 
response if coordinated with the local communications system. 
CRITICAL FACILITIES 
Critical facilities are defined by the Ad Hoc Panel as those 
required to continue life and protect property with the vital facili-
ties intact. Critical facilities are considered to be: electrical power 
lines and generation plants, natural gas lines and storage facilities, 
water and sewage lines, and treatment plants, dams, reservoirs and the 
transportation system. 
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Electrical Lines and Power Plants 
Damage to electrical power generating plants, as well as to trans-
mission and distribution systems following destructive earthquakes in 
the United States, has let this industry to use earthquake design 
criteria, which have resulted in the re la ti vely good performance of 
these facilities in large earthquakes (EERI, 1977). During the 1971 San 
Fernando shock, weakness in large pieces of electrical equipment became 
apparent. Changes in lateral force criteria for electrical equipment 
were made, and considerable research is currently underway. Existing 
equipment needed to be modified to conform to the new criteria. The 
ability of power plants to continue operation after a destructive 
earthquake is essential. 
The Sylmar Converter in San Fernando sustained over $28 million 
in damages, not including the loss of revenue due to the inoperative 
condition of the station. A summary of conclusions for electrical power 
systems in the U.S. Department of Commerce publication of the 1971 San 
Fernando Earthquake states: "(1) Power system facilities, equipment and 
supports were designed for . 20 g ground acceleration according to the 
current UBC in use. In view of the high ground acceleration within the 
area of intense ground shaking, the practice of designing electrical 
facilities for . 20 g requires reappraisal. ( 2) Brittle porcelain com-
ponents of electrical equipment are extremely vulnerable to earthquake 
shaking, damping should be considered and supports installed. (3) 
Inadequate anchorage resulted in overturned equipment, and (4) flexible 
leads are needed for equipment." 
Transmission lines have been disrupted by landslides. Conductors 
have swung together, causing short-circuiting and power outages. Dam-
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ages to the overhead electrical distribution system have been severe 
when older non-earthquake resistant buildings were in use, and fires 
have resulted. 
Underground systems are affected by differential soil movement. 
Unbraced transformers on pole-supported platforms have proven to be es-
pecially vulnerable to strong ground motions during earthquakes. 
Sierra Pacific Power Company. The Sierra Pacific Power Company is 
the sole supplier of electricity, natural gas and water for the 
Reno-Sparks community. The main power generating sources of the utility 
company lie outside of the study area: ( 1) Tracy steam plant 13 miles 
to the south in the Steamboat area, (2) the Churchill coal-fired plant 
in Yearington, 50 miles to the southeast, and ( 3) tie lines with Utah 
Power and Light, PGE and Idaho (under construction), (Fagg, 1978). All 
together, the total megawatt capacity will be approximately 1,030 
megawatts. There are several diesel-fired uni ts dispersed outside the 
study area which could be used in an emergency to produce an extra 50 
megawatts. Several stations are capable of using gas or oil for power 
generation and have on hand fuel supplies for one month's use. In 1981, 
a 500 megawatt unit is scheduled to go in at Valley Central station and 
a second unit is to go in sometime in 1983. The power company feels 
that it would be able to lose one generating station and still be able 
to provide power for the Reno-Sparks area. However, there is no double 
contingency plan (Fagg, 1978). 
Sierra Pacific's sytem operations center is located on East Mill 
Street. This building, built in 1976 to seismic design criteria, houses 
the central office for mobile unit dispatch, service and repairs. From 
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this center, it is possible to cut off electrical power in various 
areas of the Reno-Sparks complex. 
In Reno and Sparks, following the 1971 San Fernando event, 
earthquake resistant design transformer and condenser hold-downs were 
installed in al 1 new substations and to new additions of existing 
substations, but no modifications were made on substations built prior 
to 1971. The use of flexible connections for lead-in busses also 
followed the 1971 event. 
In 1972, Dennis Trexler wrote a paper on the utility company, 
outlining problems encountered during past seismic events, and went 
over the existing conditions in the Reno-Sparks area. He found: 
1. The high-voltage transf armers would sustain substantial dam-
age during .4 g ground acceleration, approximately .375 to .5 
g could overturn the transformer depending upon the height (6 
to 8 feet, respectively) 
2. Connections began to fail at about .4 g's. 
3. The underground distribution system was not designed to be 
earthquake-resistant. 
Trexler recommended (1) placing anchors capable of resisting .4 g's in 
al 1 substations, ( 2) having insulator wire connections able to with-
stand 10 inches of displacement, (3) geological engineering investiga-
tions of underground transmission lines in areas of known faults, 
specifically citing the need for flexible joints at all fault cross-
ings, and ( 4) updating of disaster preparation plans and placement of 
distribution plan maps in two separate locations that are earthquake 
and fire resistant (one person has one set of these maps at this time). 
Recommendations by Trexler that were economically feasible were even-
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tually implemented by the utility company. 
Electrical Inventory. In most areas, electrical lines from the 
substation are overhead; if enough displacement occurs along any one 
line, the tension could cause the lines to be pulled down. That could 
start fires and service could be lost. There is a chance that a line 
might function even if pulled down. Service lines to the east of 
Sparks, Raleigh Heights and northwest Reno originate at the Valley road 
substation (see Plate 3). Before this line enters the study area, the 
line crosses numerous faults. Service to the west of Highland Reservoir 
and the intersection of West Seventh Street and Bowman Drive would 
probably be in danger of being cut off by fault numbers 3, 4, and 5. 
This area is served by the Highland Substation, Northwest Substation, 
West Seventh Substation and partially by the Reno Substation, al 1 of 
which cross at least one or more faults in the area described. Sierra, 
University, Pickard, Sparks Local, McCarran, Pyra, Airport, Spanish 
Springs, El Rancho, Mill, Sutro, Alameda and Hidden Valley Substations 
are all in relatively safe areas. 
Service from Mt. Rose Substation: ( 1) crosses fault numbers 14, 
15, 19 and fault set number 18 before reaching Hunter Lake Substation, 
(2) crosses fault set numbers 18, 19, and number 21 before it gets to 
Moana Substation, and in the vicinity of South Virginia it crosses 
fault numbers 32 and 33 then, ( 3) crosses fault set number 17 and 
several other faults before reaching Hash Lane where it is crossed by 
fault number 34. The Moana substation could become totally cut off due 
to the numerous faults in the service area. 
Service from Holcomb Substation crosses fault numbers 24, 25, 26, 
and 27. This is likely to hamper service to the north of Vassar Street 
' 
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and west of south Virginia. Wheeler Substation lies within 50 feet of 
fault number 27, and might be disrupted. Electrical service to the 
north of Hymer Avenue from Sparks Independent Substation and to the 
south of Sparks Local are crossed by fault number 45. 
Damage to any or all of the above substations and transmission 
lines, which have been noted as potential breakage sites, would be 
related to the amount and type of movement on each fault. The transmis-
sion lines will sustain some increase in tension, but the amount will 
vary with the size of the lines ( Scelero, 1973) . Transf armers in most 
substations are placed on concrete piers, but some are mounted on power 
poles. The surrounding site is covered in 6 to 8 inches of crushed 
gravel which is designed to contain oil leakage from the transformers, 
should they topple. Transf or me rs have a high center of gravity and do 
not tolerate gound motion well (Trexler, 1972). Potential interruption 
of electrical services would probably be due in large part to disturb-
ance of these transformers at the ten locations cited. The potential 
for an electrically ignited oi 1 fire at some of these sites is high, 
especially during the fall, when wind-blown debris gathers on the site. 
The majority of underground high voltage lines within the Reno-
Sparks area are in relatively stable ground. 
Natural Gas 
In the San Fernando Earthquake of 1971, the natural gas lines 
generally sustained little damage except in areas having violent ground 
displacement. Welded steel mainlines of 3/4, 2, 3, and 4-inch diameters 
were most affected. Earth movement pulled, compressed, and twisted 
systems which resulted in broken mains, valves and total loss of 
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service (EERI, 1977). 
Gas Lines. Sierra Pacific Power Company buys its gas from the 
Southwest Gas Company of Idaho. The main gas line enters the Reno-
Sparks area through a 12 inch pipe, pressurized to 500 psi (see Plate 
4). This line crosses numerous faults before entering the Reno-Sparks 
area. A second major line from Indian Springs to Verdi under 80 psi 
crosses many older faults along its course. There are plans to con-
struct a plant to liquify the gas for storage. 
The southwest line shares a common carrier for 55 miles from Love-
lock to Reno with the power line that supplies electricity to the 
Reno-Sparks community. The use of a common corridor could lead to a 
dual disaster. Large surface displacement along the faults which cross 
the corridor could cause simultaneous loss of gas and electricity, in 
addition to the danger of an open gas main of relatively explosive high 
pressure gas. The utility company is aware of this, but is constrained 
to this corridor by BLM regulations (Fagg, 1978). 
Within the Reno-Sparks community, natural gas mains (4-1/2 inches 
to 16 inches in diameter) rest a minimum of 30 inches below ground in 
trenches backfilled with sand, compacted to the density of the surround-
ing soils. The mains are generally made of steel pipe which should 
sustain little damage unless large ground displacement occurs (Firth, 
1978). The gas mains are generally laid out in the same pattern as the 
water mains (see Plate 5). Regulator stations occur on every line to 
monitor the gas pressure. These stations are tied into the gas alarm 
system at the Mill Street operations center. Each mobile unit servicing 
the system is equipped with detailed maps. Whenever gas lines inter-
connect, the dresser couplings used are flexible (Firth, 1978). 
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Shut-off valvues occur in the mains about every block. According 
to the power company, in the event of a breakage, areas five city 
blocks square could be isolated. This would leave a 12-hour gas supply 
residue which would remain in the lines and could burn if ignited 
(Dobbyns, 1973). 
Gas Line Inventory. The main feeder is crossed by fault numbers 
43, 46, 47 and 98, before it reaches city gate station number 1. To the 
north, the 8-5/8 inches O.D. main serving Raleigh Heights and Stead is 
crossed many times, by fault sets 1 and 50. The northwest 12 inches 
0 .D. line from city gate number 1 to station number 2 crosses six 
faults; it is likely that Verdi could lose this service. The three 
8-5/8 inches 0. D. mains in the northwest of Reno are 1 ikely to be 
disrupted by faults numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Loss of service to the 
west of the Highland Reserver and to the southwest is probable, owing 
to potential rupture of many small 4-1/2 inches 0 .D. mains throughout 
the area. Rupturing of the 8-5/8 inches 0. D. main at Monana and Lakeside 
could cut off most gas to the southwest of Reno, along with the 8-5/8 
inches O.D. main southeast of Mayberry and California. 
Storage Tanks of the Sparks Facility. Damage to surface mounted 
and elevated tanks has occured in many earthquakes. Tanks resting on 
the ground have suffered buckled and ruptured walls as well as damaged 
and collapsed roofs. Tank movement during strong ground motion has 
resulted in the rupturing of connecting pipes and subsequent leakage of 
contents (EERI, 1977). 
Oil and gas storage facilities during the 1971 San Fernando shock 
received minor damage as the result of lessons learned in the 1933 Long 
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Beach earthquake, after which design criteria were raised (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 1973). 
The Southern Pacific Pipeline Company operates a storage tank 
farm at the east end of Sparks between Interstate 80 and the Southern 
Pacific Railroad. Neither information about the total capacity of the 
facility nor the number, age, or type of tanks, was available to the 
public. At the time of this study (1973 to 1974 data collected from air 
photos and binocular views) it was believed that there were 39 tanks 
with varying capacities. Approximately 12 had floating roofs, indica-
tive of high vapor 1 iquid storage (gas) . The rest had conical roofs, 
usually used for storage of low-vapor liquids such as oil. 
The storage tanks were designed according to A. P. I. specifica-
tions at the time of their construction, to withstand earthquakes. Some 
pipe-to-tank connections appeared to be flexible, while others were 
typical rigid boiler plate and rivet connections. All pipes noted at 
the site were heavy-duty, with massive collar joints. 
In the event of a major earthquake, the tank storage farm could 
become a disaster area, due to 1 iquefaction and densification of the 
soils. The tanks could sink into the ground or float up, causing 
potential rupturing of the tanks and failure of their connections. This 
might lead to a large oil spill, greater than could be contained by the 
dike. A spi 11 would possibly back up from the point where I-80 and 
Southern Pacific Railroad converge. At this neck are two embarkments; 
should they be breached due to strong ground motion or liquefication, 
it would then permit a potential spill to wash over the road surface 
and railroad. Either possibility could close the two major transport 
routes to the east. 
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Water Line and Treatment Facilities 
In the San Fernando earthquake the water system was extensively 
damaged. Most underground damage was associated with ground displace-
ment, although damage to older lines occurred owing to pressure varia-
tions as well. Pipelines and conduits subjected to ground settlement, 
ground shaking, liquefication or landslides and crossed fault displace-
ments, experienced breakage of joints, valves, fittings, check valves, 
meters, and isolator valves (Bolt, 1978). 
Steel storage tanks that were surface-mounted or elevated, suf-
fered buckled and ruptured walls as well as damaged and collapsed 
roofs. Tank movements have resulted in ruptured connection piping, and 
subsequent loss of contents. Only tanks were specified lateral force-
resisti ve features and have performed well (EERI, 1977). 
Pressure boosting and pressure reducing stations, pressure pumps 
and wells have had anchorage and bracing problems. They have been 
unable to function due to lack of power, and contamination. 
Sierra Pacific Power Company. In the Reno-Sparks area, the water 
mains in 1973 were 57% to 95% asbestos cement and the remainder were 
cast iron ( Dobbyns, 1973). By 1978 rubber gaskets, steel pipe, and 
plastic services were being used (Firth, 1978). The water mains will 
probably break at every fault fracture, since they are mostly rigid and 
brittle. Wherever the movement is sufficient to break a gas main, the 
water main will also break (see plate 5). Water mains occur each block, 
so that a spill area could be isolated if necessary. The fire depart-
ments carry redwood plugs, just for this contingency (Miller, 1978). 
Water mains from 4 inches to 24 inches O.D. carry water from the 
older three treatment plants and 10 water tanks on the periphery of the 
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community. The three older plants are ( 1) Highland, ( 2) Idelwild and 
(3) Hunter, all built in the early 1900's. All three of these plants 
use chemical filters and have large storage facilities (covered under 
reservoirs). These plants have been renovated (Firth, 1978). 
Water storage tanks range from 3/ 4 to 3 million gallons holding 
capacity, with a total capacity of 18.7 million gallons (Dobbyns, 
1973). Each tank is kept at least two-thirds full in case of emergency. 
Most lines to the tanks have booster pumps at the top (Firth, 1978). 
There are currently two types of tanks in use: (1) above ground 
steel-welded and (2) underground reinforced concrete tanks. The under-
ground tanks appear to be more seismic-resistant, so the utility is in 
the process of changing over to this newer design (Firth, 1978). 
The three water treatment facilities in the area are fed by the 
Truckee River and 16 community wells. The wells produce 38 million 
gallons per day. The three plants produce 65 million gallons per day. 
These plants were fast approaching their capacity; a new plant, 
using a mixed media filter, went on-line in 1978, on Glendale Road. It 
has a capacity of 25 million gallons per day, but has no storage reser-
voirs. This new plant is built to seismic design criteria of the 1976 
UBC. The plant is remotely controlled from the Mill Street operations 
center, and is believed to be above the potential flood plain. 
In the event of an emergency, areas in the community could be 
temporarily out of portable water, due to possible contamination from 
ruptured sewage lines and flooding. 
Inventory of Water Lines. The two 18 inches 0. D. steel water 
mains running north to Raleigh Heights intersect faults set numbers 1 
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and 50. This line flows to four booster pumps and three storage tanks 
which supply both Raleigh Heights and Stead. If this line would 
rupture, the storage in these tanks might be able to supply the area 
for a few days, if the tanks were to remain standing and functional. 
The main lines serving the northwest Reno area would be ruptured 
numerous times. The Highlands Tank numbe·r 2 is located by fault set 
number 1 and would be damaged. Rupturing of 12 inches and 18 inches 
lines in the southwest areas of Reno would cut off service to the west 
of California and Mayberry Streets, south to West Plum Lane and west of 
South Virginia. 
In downtown Reno, several major lines ranging from 10 inches to 
24 inches O.D. could be cut several times by faults numbers 26, 27 and 
25. This would cut off the service from pumps to the south. and to the 
downtown area which would be dependent on service from the pumping 
stations north of the Truckee River. 
In Sparks, fault number 45 intersects three mains in the vicinity 
of the Nevada State Hospital and the area east to Fifteenth Street. A 
large water storage tank and pump station are located northwest of 
Pyramid Way. This provides pressure for the Sparks water system. 
Sewage Treatment Plants 
Ground shaking, differential earth movements, landslides and loss 
of power, have caused most damage to sewer treatment plants, and have 
rendered facilities inoperable (EERI, 1977). Sewer lines of vitrified 
clay tile shatter in fault zones (Trexler, 1972). 
Reno/Sparks Facility. This joint treatment plant is located on 
the east side of the Truckee Meadows where the Truckee River enters the 
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Canyon. This plant in 1967 replaced the older Sparks treatment plant, 
which had sustained pipe damage in the 1966 Truckee, California earth-
quake (5.4 Richter). 
Sewage is carried to the plant by a 30 inch gravity plume from 
both cities. Reno has several lift stations along the route. A large 
part of the plant consists of underground concrete tunnels. The plant 
is built of structural concrete with steel reinforcements which met the 
1967 Federal engineering specifications for ground shaking. 
The plant has its own water system, while heating and boiler 
firing use gas (Hancock, 1976). This facility is almost a self-
contained unit, purchasing only its electricity from Sierra Pacific 
Power. The joint plant is part of the utility service which could be 
severely damaged by a major earthquake due to: ( 1) the age of the 
facility and UBC criteria, now outdated, (2) its location on potential-
ly liquefiable fine sand and sil teds in an area with a high water 
table, ( 3) its geographic location next to the Truckee River and the 
confluence of Steamboat Creek--both susceptible to local flooding (see 
section' on Truckee River) and (4) the existence of a large, potentially 
active fault scarp (fault number 39) within one-quarter mile to the 
south which runs along the base of the Virginia Range by Steamboat 
Creek. 
Sparks Sewer System. The sewer system in Sparks is managed by the 
Public Works Department of Sparks. All the utility lines, including the 
sewer lines, are buried. In Sparks, the water table is close to the 
surface, which decreases the soil strength, especially in areas of 
compacted fill. This makes the utility lines vulnerable to disruption 
by possible liquefaction during a major earthquake. 
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Most lateral lines from 4 inches on up are made of cast iron or 
fiber pipe. The truck lines are generally made of concrete (see plate 
number 6). The interc::eptor sewer line for Sparks crosses potentially 
active fault number 45; damage, disruption, or severage is possible. 
The sewer trunk on Pyramid Way, north of the Oddie Boulevard intersec-
tion, crosses a recent Holocene fault number 44; damage of the line is 
1 ikely. Seepage of sewer effluent from broken lines could cause local 
contamination problems. 
Reno Sewer System. In Reno, the sewer system is managed by the 
Department of Public Works. The utility lines, including the sewers, 
are buried, and there is potential for liquefication. The airport area 
and adjacent southeast parts of Reno in the Truckee Meadows are in 
greatest danger due to their soil type (Bingler, 1974). Sewer lines 
crossing any potentially active fault are likely to be disrupted, if 
displacement occurs. 
Contamination from broken lines in the faulted area in southwest 
Reno (fault numbers 13, 14 and 15) could potentially flow into the 
Virginia Lake and the Last-Chance ditches. In southern Reno, the trunk 
sewer line that follows Lakside Drive also follows fault number 24. 
Contamination of Virginia Lake is probable. Local service in the area 
bound on the south by Pueblo Street and on the west by Holcomb, could 
be cut off as a result of active fault numbers 25, 26 and 27. 
Contamination of the Truckee River is possible, especially if conse-
quent flooding occurs, though to what degree, is uncertain. 
Chlorine treatment stations could be temporarily shut down, owing 
to electrical power loss in areas of potentially active faults. This 
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would enhance the problems of contamination by sewage. 
Surface Water Ways 
Earthen and rock-filled dams, using the hydraulic fill method of 
construction, have sustained serious damages from earthquakes, and some 
dams have failed. Rolled earthen dams, on the other hand, have with-
stood high ground acceleration quite wel 1, sustaining only minor dam-
ages (EERI 1977). Downstream populations and critical facilities must 
be considered in evaluating the safety of dams. 
~· Regional flooding has occurred prior to the 1960's in the 
Truckee River Drainage. The floods were seasonal, taking place in late 
fall and winter months when rainstorms accompanied by high temperature 
caused rapid melting of the snowpack. The flash floods would inundate a 
3 to 4-block-wide strip though the downtown Reno area and affect 6,000 
to 7,000 acres in the Truckee Meadows (Bingler, 1976), (see Figure 10). 
To remedy this problem, four rolled earthen dams were completed 
between 1960 and 1963 which reduced this type of flood hazard from the 
Truckee River and its tributary drainages of Prosser and Martis Creeks 
(Nishikawa, 1980). In the Reno-Sparks area, there are four dams which 
make up the Peavine Water Shed Project. These four dams are situated in 
the hilly northwest part of Reno. All four--the Upper Peavine, Lower 
Peavine, East Wash and West Wash dams--are operated and maintained by 
the City of Reno for flood control (See Plate 7). Most of the year, the 
dams are dry (Jones, 1978). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers surveyed 
these dams in 1979 and concluded that they represented a minor hazard 
in the event of a major earthquake. 
SL 
( 9L61 'o-qo...;r OU8(:l WO...l..>J) 
·u--•61.1a 10 MUO~ "'"'"" "S ·n '"II Aq 





~~41~~!?. ..... ~ .. ~:-~ ..... 
•. ·.··.··· ...•. · /.~e:•';,_t-•::',., 
,,~~~ti'}'';. ~6~~~ ~-·. ,.._~:...;'r & ... #~·(·,··· ...... ~. ,.Ri#l.:.,.~~~ ... , l ~··~<ii :;}!dct~~~~'i~-~~f.;~itf;~~~t·.~~'1:;~ . ·;: -~~;~j~~ 
76 
East Wash Dam is crossed by fault number 2 near its crest, and 
above it is a sequence of post-Tertiary faults. West Wash Dam does not 
have any faults directly under it. However, faults numbers 2, 3 and 4 
lie close to it. The Upper Peavine Dam is cut by two faults of set 
number 1 and note that one is near the crest. Lower Peavine Darn is 
underlain by fault number 4. These dams, in general, will contain water 
during the winter flood season and after thermal summer storms; if a 
major earthquake occurred while the water level was high in either 
Upper Peavine or East Wash, failure could occur. 
Failure of the East Wash Dam is unlikely; however, if it did 
contain a large volume of water and there was movement on the fault at 
its crest, a flood could wash over (1) Van Ness Avenue to Peavine Road 
where it joins Keystone Avenue, (2) Whitaker Park, (3) I-80, (4) Doten 
School area unti 1 it joined the Truckee River drainage (see Figure 10 
showing older flood pattern). 
Failure of the Upper Peavine Dam is also unlikely, but if the 
circumstances were right, the water released would flow into the Lower 
Peavine Dam, causing it, in turn, to overtop. Water would probably flow 
down Elmcrest Avenue to Keystone. There, it would wash southeast under 
I-80 and continue on southeast until joining the Truckee River. 
Either event could cause flooding similar to that incurred before 
the flood control project was established. 
Reservoirs. Highland Reservoir, Hunter Lake, and Wheeler Lake are 
owned by the Sierra Pacific Power Company. Highland Reservoir pools 
were constructed from 1880 to 1905. The pools contain 10 surface acres 
with a volume of 54 million gallons. The darn is believed to be earthern 
fill. Up-slope approximately 600 feet ( 185 meters) is a fault which 
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cuts middle Quaternary deposits. This same fault runs directly under 
Lake Park. Both the Reservoir and Lake are in dense residential areas. 
Liquefaction or rupturing of these structures could cause flooding to 
the immediate south. Highland Reservoir is considered to be the most 
hazardous reservoir by the Army Corps of Engineers (Firth, 1978), due 
to uncertainty regarding the materials and methods used to construct 
it, its age, large volume and location. Hunter Lake is at the west end 
of Reno, and contains five surface acres of water and has an 18-million 
gallon capacity. The dam is an earthen structure with parts dating back 
to 1863 to 1904. Unfortunately, it is outside the limits of my geo-
logical data base. 
Wheeler Lake has 46 surface acres, with a capacity of 190 
acres/foot. The dam is earth-filled and dates back to 1889. The Wheeler 
Lake dam is crossed by fault number 23 on its eastern side. Release of 
water from this point would present a problem mainly to the local golf 
enthusiasts, as the Lake is in the middle of a golf course. 
Virginia Lake is owned by the City of Reno. The Lake holds 140 
acre feet and is impounded by earthern fill dam of unknown age. 
Virginia Lake is bordered on the east and west by active fault numbers 
24 and 31. The combined movement of the two faults could produce varied 
results. The most serious possibility would probably be flooding of the 
Orchard Trailer Park and Park Lane shopping center. 
Paradise Park Lake in Sparks is a very recent earthen structure 
dating to the mid-1970's. It is not near any faults. The only possible 
problem could be from earthquake-generated waves (Seichs). 
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The Truckee River 
The Truckee River bisects downtown Reno. West of Reno, two to 
three miles on the Truckee River, is an older complex of landslides in 
the Mogul area. If this slide complex were activated during the rainy 
season by an earthquake, the river could become dammed by the slide 
(Trexler, 1973). Water would build up until the slide was topped, the 
overflowing water would quickly erode the loose unconsolidated alluvial 
materials, releasing a torrent of water and debris. The destructive 
force of the torrent would depend upon the magnitude of the landslide 
and the size of the body of water trapped before overtopping. It is 
possible that the area from Liberty Street to the airport could be 
covered by flood waters-compounding the problems of rescue, water 
contamination from broken sewage pipes and emergency coordination. 
The Mogul slide area has been historically active: in 1940, when 
a landslide covered the Steamboat Ditch and in 1964, during the Boca 
Earthquake ( 6. 4 on the Richter Scale), (Trexler, 1978). This area was 
recently monitored by Pease and Trexler for yearly movement, while 
funding was available. Truckee River is currently undercutting the toe 
of the landslide (Bureau of Mines Open File Report, 1976). 
After passing through Reno, the Truckee River is intersected by 
fault number 45 near Glendale Road, within Sparks. Movement on this 
fault could cause some localized flooding to the west, if the movement 
on the fault raised the land to the east of the intersection. Below 
this point, there are two diversion darns which protect the airport from 
flooding. 
To the east, the Truckee River flows into a canyon area (past the 
Vista Freeway exit) where, during the rainy season steep slopes, corn-
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bined with rapid ground acceleration, could cause landslides. This 
would back up water into the Vista and Glendale Road areas, flooding 
I-80 and the railroad. Flood water from the west could be blocked thus 
worsening the flooding situation. The time of year in which an earth-
quake occurred would make a difference in the amount of flooding of 
both the reservoirs and Truckee River. 
No information about the effect of seismic activity on slumps to 
the west in the Mustang area is available as yet (Bell, 1978; Trexler, 
1980). Areas of poorly consolidated material on steep slopes could, 
however, pose a hazard. 
The Reno area experiences its heaviest rainfall from December 
through March with runoff from melting snowpack peaking in May. The 
Truckee's flow is highest in April. The amount of water available 
during the year would also affect the fire stations because if water 
mains were broken or if no pressure existed, the Truckee could be the 
only source of water (see Plate 7). 
Creeks. To the southeast of Sparks, near the Virginia Range Front 
Fault, Steamboat Creek flows into the Truckee River. This is a low-
lying area that has a high liquefaction and flooding potential. 
Other local drainages known to be subject to local flooding are: 
(1) Hunter Creek, (2) Evans Creek, (3) Alum Creek and (4) the Sun 
Valley drainage along Orr ditch in northern Sparks. 
Ditch System. There are seven ditches in the Reno-Sparks area, 
all eventually connect to the Truckee River, and to each other via an 
aqueduct system. The di tc:hes are: ( 1) Orr Ditch, ( 2) Steamboat Ditch, 
( 3) Last Chance Ditch, ( 4) Lake Ditch, ( 5) Pioneer Ditch ( 6) Cochran 
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and (7) Highland Ditch (owned by Sierra Pacific Power Company). The Orr 
Ditch is undercut by fault number 43 in western Reno by a steep road 
embankment which could collapse during an earthquake, letting water 
flow into the Truckee River. Lake Ditch is crossed by faults numbers 13 
and 14; spillage here would cause minor damage. Lake Ditch is also 
underlain by fault number 25 near the County Golf Course; flooding 
there would cause little damage. Last Chance Ditch is cut several times 
by fault number 13, 14, 15 and 25. Some damage by flooding is likely to 
occur there. Pioneer Ditch in Sparks has a low flood potential. 
The aqueduct in downtown Reno is repeatedly crossed by faults 
numbers 24, 25, 26 and 27 before it enters Virginia lake. This is the 
only aqueduct in serious danger from an earthquake. 
All the ditches have spill facilities for handling overflows and 
the amount of water in the ditches is regulated (Dukes, 1978). The 
significant problem with the ditch system is that of possible sewage 
contamination, which could rapidly lead to a serious health hazard. 
Transportation 
The first real test of freeway structures occurred in the 1971 
San Fernando earthquake. The main deficiency was the inadequate tying 
together of spans and structural elements of bridges and overpasses. 
Since then, the design criteria have been modified and other structures 
in California have been retrofitted to increase their lateral-load 
carrying abilities. The 1976 Guatemala earthquake provided evidence 
that structures with this new design could survive a major earthquake 
(EERI, 1977). Damage to road beds has been associated mainly with 
permanent ground displacement. To date, highway tunnels in the United 
States have not been tested under severe ground motion. 
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Highways. In the Reno-Sparks community, there are three major 
highway systems; (1) U.S. 395, (2) Interstate 80 and (3) U.S. 40. 
U.S. 395, before entering Reno from the south crosses seven 
post-tertiary faults, (Fault sets 1 and 50) some are associated with 
steep road embankments which could be subject to minor slumping and 
rockfalls. Within Reno, Highway Alt 395 (BUSN) crosses potentially 
active faults numbers 25, 26 and 24 north of Virginia Lake. Alt 395 
then crosses faults numbers 35, 36 and near 31 and 29 from Mays Lane 
southward. Most of the Reno area is underlain by unconsolidated outwash 
deposits with potential for liquefaction. Locally, these soils could 
amplify strong ground motion during a major seismic event. 
Highway 40 comes into Reno along the Truckee River from the west 
and, at the eastern end of Sparks, rejoins Interstate 80. Upon entering 
west Reno, it crosses fault number 12 by a road cut. Minor slumping 
could occur here in a major earthquake. 
Interstate 80 crosses a complex of faults at its entrance to Reno 
from the west, and the soils there are prone to slumping along road 
cuts. In Sparks, I-80 encounters potentially active fault number 45. 
There are two other minor highways, State Highway 33 to Pyramid 
Lake, and State Highway 34, which converges with State Highway 33, and 
crosses fault number 44 in a potentially hazardous area (see water 
tanks section) • 
There are numerous overpasses and underpasses on the I-80 and 
U.S. 395 system. In 1976 an investigation of Ramp number 13 in Reno for 
seismic response was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
under the supervision of Dr. Bruce Douglas of the Civil Engineering 
Department, University of Nevada at Reno. Ramp number 13 is a six-span 
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composite girder bridge built in 1961, located at the interchange 
complex of U.S. 395 and I-80. This ramp provides access to U.S. 395 
south for east-bound traffic on I-80. The interchange complex also 
crosses over the southern Pacific Railroad line. The investigation 
revealed that during a minor earthquake of 5. 5 some structural damage 
would occur, and that during a maximum probable earthquake of 7. 2 the 
bridge would probably collapse. Another study is currently underway at 
the University of Nevada to determine the earthquake response of other 
briges and overpasses. Data from that study by Dr. Douglas should be 
published later in 1981. 
Bridges. Mr. Hay of the Washoe Civil Defense in an interview in 
1978 was of the opinion that it is possible that all the bridges over 
the Truckee River could be damaged and lost during a major earthquake. 
Bridges which could possibly sustain damage and still be usable are (1) 
Arlington, ( 2) Southern Rock Boulevard, ( 3) North Mccarron and ( 4) 
Kietzke. The Keystone Bridge collapsed in 1977 after the passage of a 
truck with a load of strawberries and has not yet been rebuilt. 
Railroads. Damage to railways has occurred in numerous earth-
quakes, generally as a consequence of permanent ground subsidence, 
displacement, or landslides. In general, railroad bridges have per-
formed better in earthquakes than have highway bridges, because the 
structures are tied together by rails (EERI, 1977). There have been no 
recent design changes as a result of earthquakes for railroads and 
railway bridges. 
The Southern Pacific Railroad bisects Reno's downtown area; this 
causes massive traffic problems at grade crossings whenever a train 
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goes by or stops at the Amtrak station. The railroad line is crossed 
several times by bridges and overpasses associated with the U.S. 395 
and I-80 system, failure of any of these spans could block the rail 
system. The entrance to the Sparks switch yard is crossed by potential-
ly active fault number 45. This is the only fault scarp crossed by the 
railroad in the Reno-Sparks area, but it could cause enough displace-
ment to render the east-west rail system temporarily useless. 
To the north of the Reno Amtrak depot is a spur line of the 
Western Pacific Railroad which meanders to the north towards Stead 
where it crosses several faults. It is doubtful that this line would be 
usable in the event of a major earthquake. 
Airport. Aside from damage to buildings and col lapse of control 
towers, most damage to airports has been to runways and utility connec-
tions. The loss of electrical power for communications and other ser-
vices has crippled operations. 
The Cannon International Airport is in no apparent danger from 
known fracturing. The entire area is, however, underlain by alluvial 
material that could mask fault traces. There are two major potential 
hazards associated with earthquakes which could severely affect the 
airport: (1) the soil is extremely susceptible to liquefaction and (2) 
flooding danger due to the low elevation and to reactivation of the 
Mogul slump block upstream near Verdi. If this slide were triggered by 
a major earthquake, disastrous flooding could occur (see Reservoirs and 
Rivers section) which would cover the entire airport area. 
CHAPTER VI 
CRUCIAL AND DANGEROUS FACILITIES 
Crucial facilities are those, both public and private, which have 
high occupancy rates. Non-structural damage is expected to occur; how-
ever, failure of the buildings would incur large loss of life, which is 
not an acceptable situation. The public schools, and high-rise build-
ings fall into this category. 
WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
At the time of my preliminary survey in 1973, there were five 
schools known to be structurally inadequate. Al 1 were bui 1 t before 
1930, and were expected to collapse or fail to some degree during an 
earthquake. The school district had tentative plans to close the unsafe 
schools whenever it became economically feasible. The five schools 
were: ( 1) Mary S. Doten, ( 2) Orvis Ring Grammar School, ( 3) McKinley 
Park, (4) Mt. Rose Grammar School and (5) D.B. Billinghurst Jr. High. 
Orvis Ring was the last to be condemned in June of 1978. The School 
District is considering renovating Mt. Rose Grammar School to current 
standards, if funding can be found (Robb, 1978). 
The Washoe County School District has been aware of the local 
earthquake potential since the early 1950 's. Facilities built since 
then have been designed with safety factors above those required in the 
Uniform Building Code current at the time of their construction (Dr. 
Piccolo, 1976). 
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In 1956, the responsibility for design approval was delegated to 
the State Planning Board. Once the designs are approved, it is left up 
to each county school district to carry out construction inspections. 
The State Planning Board does require a foundation study to 
assure adequate bearing capacity for soi ls at the site, but no fault 
study is required. There are no codes specifying resistance to lateral 
forces, as generated by earthquakes, for a private or public structure 
in the state of Nevada; only federal laws are enforced. There are no 
state code requirements regarding site inspection near an active fault 
scarp and no state agency is apparently responsible for checking the 
existing structure for earthquake safety. Safety inspections are per-
formed only when the facility undergoes a change in use or when a 
complaint is filed concerning the building safety with the Nevada 
Industrial Commission. 
Currently, there are 22 elementary schools, six middle schools 
and three secondary schools in Reno. The seismic resistance of each 
building needs to be determined individually by a specialist. The last 
known report on the structure and safety of schools was compiled by 
John, Webster and Brown, civil and structural engineers, in October of 
1971. In light of new research and building techniques which resulted 
from the San Fernando Earthquake of 1972, a new study is needed to 
re-evaluate school facilities. 
In Reno, there are several schools in potentially dangerous 
sites, should an earthquake occur: (1) Anderson, (2) Peavine, (3) 
Towler, ( 4) St. Alberts, ( 5) Clayton Jr. High, ( 6) Warner, ( 7) Swabe 
Jr. High, ( 8) Vaughn, ( 9) Reno Jr. Academy and ( 10) Elmcrest. Both 
Elmcrest and Peavine are either on or within one block of number 5 
86 
while the others are located within two blocks of known faults or in 
the Zones previously noted on page 29-30 (see Plate 2). 
In Sparks there are nine elementary schools, two middle schools, 
and two high schools. Three schools are in hazardous sites on a fault 
trace located diagonally between Greenbrae Elementary, Sparks High and 
Mitchel Elementary School (see Plate 2). 
HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS 
In the past, buildings of over five stories have been more 
susceptible to seismic damage than one and two story buildings. Damage 
has been concentrated on the exits, entrances, stairways, elevators and 
interior wall partitions. High-rise buildings have posed special prob-
lems in fire control, because ladders can only be extended to 75 feet. 
As previously mentioned, Washoe County does require specific fire con-
trol systems for these buildings. High-rise buildings which pre-date 
the 1976 UBC need to be reevaluated in terms of seismic response, owing 
to changes made in lateral loading requirements. 
DANGEROUS OLDER BUILDINGS 
Reno has undergone extensive development in the last decade; over 
50% of the downtown area has been rebuilt (Bonham, 1978). This has 
helped to mitigate the hazards of older buildings but has increased the 
problems encountered with high-rise buildings. 
Students from the University of Nevada at Reno have catalogued in 
term papers dangerous older structures having parapets and facades from 
1974 to 1978. Parapets are structures that extend above the roofline of 
a building which aid in fire control and prevent water from falling 
onto the street below. Historically, parapets and facades have fallen 
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during seismic events, killing pedestrians in the streets below. The 
bulk of older parapets occur in downtown Reno. Most of these parapets 
are over 20 years old, made of brick and may not be adequately tied to 
the buildings. A second dangerous area has been identified along South 
Virginia, East Second, East Fourth and East Sixth streets in Reno. Some 
older parapets also occur along "B" street in Sparks. All of the above 
mentioned streets are the most heavily traveled in the Reno-Sparks 
complex. Tourism (casino's) is concentrated almost soley in the areas 
of maximum parapet hazard. 
In Reno and Sparks, building inspections are made only when there 
is a change in occupancy or business within a structure. Once inspec-
tion has been made, the cities lack the means to have a building 
brought up to code, except by beginning the lengthy and complicated 
process of condemnation. The Ad Hoc Panel in 1979 suggested the use of 
a remodeling permit to correct deficiencies. Charging an extra fee 
added to the property tax was further suggested for structures having 
dangerous parapets and facades. 
Sparks is a younger city which, until recently, functioned bas-
ically as a bedroom community for Reno. Sparks has experienced rapid 
urban growth and subsequent appearance of numberous shopping centers. 
Large wholesaling, warehousing and storage establishments have sprung 
up in the Truckee Meadows area, giving Sparks an economic base for con-
tinued growth. Structures in Sparks tend to have only one and two 
stories. While taller buildings do occur, they are rare in comparison 
to Reno, and the taller structures in Sparks are new. Sparks has few 
dangerous older buildings to contend with. 
CHAPTER VII 
CIVIL DEFENSE 
The Washoe County Civil Defense agency had its Emergency Opera-
tions Center (E.O.C.) in the basement of the Washoe County courthouse, 
located at the junction of Court and Sierra Streets. In 1976, the 
Washoe County Civil defense center was moved to 3031 Boington Lane, 
southeast of the airport. This newer facility is a prefabricated metal 
building with a concrete pad. It is located in an area of high ground 
water subject to liquefaction and recurrent flooding. The Washoe County 
Civil Defense facility has emergency power generating capabilities and 
a mobile unit which could serve as communications center, if the 
building were damaged. The E.O.C. has communication ties not only with 
the fire and police departments but with most government agencies in 
the area. In the event of an emergency or a natural disaster, pre-
selected individuals in the community would meet under the director of 
the Civil Defense Agency at the E.O.C. From the E.O.C. disaster 
analysis teams would travel to stricken areas, analyze the damage and 
report back to the E.O.C., where decisions would be made regarding the 
proper course of action. At a later time, State and Federal disaster 
teams would meet with the Civil Defense officials at the E.O.C. to 
determine necessary aid for the community. 
Since the mid-1970's, emergency seismic simulation exercises have 
been held on an annual basis assuming a variety of possible epicenters. 
These exercises have included all public and private agencies who would 
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be involved in a natural disaster. Seismic hazards such as fire mitiga-
tion, high-rise building collapse, school evacuations and reservoir 
flooding have been taken into account in the exercises. Data banks have 
been established and are maintained to contain information on the 
utility lines, plans of high rise buildings, location of seismic instru-
ments, geologic and soil maps, and hospital capabilities. In 1979, 
while interviewing Mr. Hay, director of the agency, it came to the 
writer's attention that there was no plan for the eventuality of 
consequent large-scale flooding caused by landsliding (i.e. , Mogul or 
Mustang areas). It is hoped that this has since been remedied. 
In 1973, during the first stage of the study it was noted that 
many Civil Defense shelters were situated in basements of older or 
high-rise buildings. These shelters would not be usable after a seismic 
event, and supplies stored in them would be lost. A survey of seismic-
ally safe shelters was underway in 1979, and a plan of action specif-
ically for earthquake disaster, existed. Effects of the seasonality, 
time of day, and tourist season were included in the earthquake 
disaster plan, as well as a mutual aid plan with the National Guard and 
State Civil Defense. In conjunction with the E.O.C., the health depart-
ment had established critical points to place water purification units 
in the event of contamination. 
DISASTER AWARENESS 
The .Washoe County Civil Defense program's growing awareness of 
earthquake disaster can be traced to community lectures and research by 
the University on earthquakes, as well as state and Federal legislation 
recently enacted. In 1978 and 1979 the State of Nevada Disaster Plan, a 
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part of the State of Nevada Emergency Plan, was revised and updated to 
include an analysis of earthquake hazards in the state. 
Prior to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Panel, there was no 
state or local entity or program that provided coordination and communi-
cation with respect to the full spectrum of seismic hazards. The Civil 
Defense program was the only one concerned which involved individuals 
from different governmental agencies. 
The perception of the problem of seismic hazards is growing, but 
as was noted by the Ad Hoc Panel work still remains to be done. Further 
plans need to made concerning ( 1) using local contractors of heavy 
equipment to aid in debris removal and fire fighting, (2) preservation 
of the underground utilities through modification of construction re-
quirements and possible code changes. 
OTHER AGENCIES 
Every agency or department contacted between 1973 and 1979 had 
contingency plans of some sort for disasters. Few had specific plans 
for a seismic disaster, and the few existing plans were not coordinated 
with the Civil Defense plan until 1979. The Nevada Bell Telephone 
Company had the most sophisticated disaster contingency plans for a 
seismic event of all utility companies investigated. More communica-
tion, evaluation and coordination is needed to form a comprehensive 
seismic plan for Washoe County. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SPARKS 
The City of Sparks can probably cope with the known faults within 
the city. Small recurrent movements of these faults may disrupt utility 
and communications 1 ines, but the faults are, for the most part, in 
residential areas where building damage would not be unduly great. 
Sparks has few high-rise buildings that will be affected by ground 
shaking. The older part of Sparks has nearly been replaced with newer 
single story buildings; such as have the least response to strong 
ground motion. 
Sparks without a doubt will be a metropolitan part of the Truckee 
Meadows that will continue to grow in years to come. Decisions can be 
made now that will minimize high-rise building damage from strong 
ground motion. Sparks is in a unique position with respect to planning 
for earthquake damage in that it is able to take advantage of new 
knowledge of seismic risk. It remains to be seem whether responsible 
people will take the initiative and make the decision to keep potential 
earthquake damage to.a minimum. 
Sparks also needs a flood-control plan tied into the seismic 
hazard plan of Washoe County. Flooding as a consequence of a large 
earthquake could create a very serious situation, when combined with 
the seismic shaking hazards. 
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RENO 
In Reno many of the vital and critical facilities are located in 
hazardous areas. Government and local officials are becoming more aware 
of the danger through increased publicity, research and awareness of 
recent increases in seismic activity. This has resulted in the greater 
design strength required by the new 1979 UBC. It has also caused 
designers to build above the code minimum, and to use more advanced 
dynamic analysis in structural designs. This is a good trend in view of 
the inadequate codes. 
Reno has taken the first major step in the improvement of their 
life sustaining facilities with the completion of the Public Safety 
Building. More lifeline facilities should however, be relocated and 
placed in areas of least hazard. Because of the large number of 
high-rises and older buildings in Reno, it is imperative that these 
buildings be catalogued by an engineering team and investigated on a 
site-specific basis. In any case, adequate emergency coordination and 
communications systems must be implemented. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Legislation as recommened by the Ad Hoc Panel is sorely needed, 
but if nature follows her normal cour~e it will be done only after a 
seismic disaster. It is inappropriate to list again all of the panel's 
recommendations (see Pages 37 to 38) but the following minimum actions 
should be taken with all possible haste: ( 1) revisions of NRS 278 .160 
to require preparation of a seismic safety plan as an element of city, 
county and regional master plans, ( 2) adoption of all of the 1979 UBC 
seismic provisions. ( 3) adoption of Alquist-Priolo legislation requir-
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ing seismic site specific planning (see page 44). Creation of a 
comprehensive civil defense plan to cope with seismic hazards. 
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